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INTRODUCTION 
In several jurisdictions in the United States, a rapist who causes his victim 
to become pregnant commits an aggravated sexual assault. Having committed 
an aggravated crime, he will be subjected to a longer prison sentence relative to 
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his counterpart whose victim does not become pregnant consequent to the rape. 
The rapist who causes a woman to become pregnant will be treated as if he 
broke his victim’s leg, gave her severe head trauma, or shot her with a gun. 
That is, the victim’s pregnancy is treated the same as a broken bone, a concus-
sion, or a gunshot wound. This intriguing result is the product of sexual assault 
statutes that provide that pregnancy is a “substantial bodily injury” that can ag-
gravate a crime. These laws, which function to construct pregnancy as an inju-
ry, are interesting for many reasons, two of which this Article explores in 
depth.  
First, the construction of pregnancy as an injury runs directly counter to 
positive constructions of pregnancy within culture.1 The fact that the criminal 
law embodies this decidedly negative construction of pregnancy is important: it 
creates the possibility that this conception of pregnancy may be received within 
culture as a construction of pregnancy that is as legitimate as positive construc-
tions. In this way, these laws create possibilities for the reimagining of preg-
nancy within other areas of law and, ultimately, society more generally. Essen-
tially, this Article uses the event of pregnancy to analyze the dialectical 
relationship between law and culture. How is pregnancy experienced and un-
derstood within culture?2 How may that experience and understanding come to 
be reflected within law? How may that reflection, in turn, influence experiences 
and understandings of pregnancy within culture? And the dialectic turns.3 
 
 1. “Culture” is an intensely underdefined concept. See Sally Engle Merry, Law, 
Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 575, 579 (1998) 
(“Constructing a definition for anthropology’s core concept has always been difficult, but at 
no time more so than the present. Culture is everywhere a topic of concern and analysis from 
cultural studies to literature to all the social sciences[,] . . . suggesting both its significance 
and its elusiveness as a category of analysis.”). Nevertheless, this Article uses “culture” to 
refer to an unbounded system in which meanings are created and disputed. See Naomi 
Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 42 (2001) (defining culture as a “set of 
shared, signifying practices—practices by which meaning is produced, performed, contested, 
or transformed”). 
 2. Of course, there is no single answer to this question. Pregnancy is experienced and 
understood in multiple and contradictory ways. The purpose of this Article is to interrogate 
how pregnancy may be experienced by women whose pregnancies are unwanted, how that 
experience may come to be reflected in the law, and the significance thereof. 
 3. This conceptualization of the dialectic between law and culture differs from 
scholarship that theorizes the two phenomena as having a unidirectional relationship. The 
“mirror theory” offers law as no more than a reflection of the norms that originate in culture; 
as such, culture produces law. See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Glocalizing Law and 
Culture: Towards a Cross-Constitutive Paradigm, 67 ALB. L. REV. 617, 619 (2003) (noting 
the “mirror thesis,” which theorizes law as derivative of culture, with the law being “a mirror 
of society that operates to maintain social order”); see also Menachem Mautner, Essay, 
Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 841 (2011) (noting an 
approach to the study of law that holds that “statutes are not meant to create law; rather, their 
function is to reflect existing social practices”); Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 486 (2003) (noting the highly influential and still pervasive thought 
of jurist Patrick Devlin, who considered the law as “the arm of a coherent antecedent culture 
that is the ultimate source of society’s identity and authority”). The “constitutive theory,” in 
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Second, in constructing pregnancy as an injury, these laws recall the argu-
mentation that proponents of abortion rights once made—argumentation that 
one no longer hears or sees in the debates surrounding abortion. In decades 
past, advocates for the abortion right made their case in the language of injury: 
unwanted pregnancies were injuries to the women forced to bear them. Abor-
tion figured as a healing modality, serving to heal a woman of her injury. This 
advocacy never quite made it into abortion jurisprudence. As a consequence, 
perhaps, the construction of unwanted pregnancy as an injury disappeared from 
the language of abortion rights activism. However, recent developments in an-
tiabortion argumentation counsel its retrieval. There has been a shift in antia-
bortion argumentation away from a focus on the fetus and toward a focus on 
the woman. In this shift, abortion is wrong, not because it harms the fetus, but 
rather because it harms the pregnant woman. The Court in Gonzales v. Carhart 
(Carhart II) accepted this position, upholding a law that restricted access to 
abortion because it seemed “unexceptionable” to conclude that “some women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus-
tained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”4 Because the Court 
accepted as true that abortion harms women, it is reasonable to expect that op-
ponents of abortion rights will continue to advocate in this register. In light of 
this, the incredible significance of constructing unwanted pregnancy as an inju-
 
comparison, offers a more agentive representation of the law, with the law standing apart 
from culture and functioning to create the culture upon which it acts; as such, law produces 
culture. See Mautner, supra, at 841 (noting the “constitutive” approach to the study of law, 
which “views law as participating in the constitution of culture and thereby in the 
constitution of people’s minds, practices, and social relations”); see also Post, supra, at 488-
89 (noting that “law is sometimes used to revise and reshape culture” and “[o]n this account, 
the law does not merely reflect the norms of a pre-existing culture, but is instead itself a 
medium that both instantiates and establishes culture”). A theory of the dialectical 
relationship between law and culture recognizes the aptness—and the simultaneity—of both 
the mirror theory and the constitutive theory. Accordingly, while culture invariably produces 
law, law invariably produces culture. See Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop 
Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983, 987 (2004) (“There is a symbiotic relationship 
between culture and law. Culture shapes the law, and law is a product of culture.”); Mautner, 
supra, at 856 (“[A] comprehensive understanding of the relations between law and society 
would have to be circular—viewing society as creative of law, which in turn acts upon 
society, . . . and so forth.”); Paul Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: 
Surveying the Benefits of a Cultural Analysis of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2002) 
(book review) (noting the “important relationship between law and culture: how legal 
institutions construct social reality, how ‘law talk’ gets dispersed throughout society, . . . and 
how law symbolically reflects and reinforces deep cultural attitudes, fears, or beliefs”); see 
also Mezey, supra note 1, at 47 (“[L]aw’s power is discursive and productive as well as 
coercive. Law participates in the production of meanings within the shared semiotic system 
of a culture, but it is also a product of that culture and the practices that reproduce it.”). 
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu perhaps stated it most eloquently when he observed, “It would 
not be excessive to say that [law] creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is 
this world which first creates the law.” Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a 
Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 839 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987). 
 4. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citation omitted). 
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ry is revealed: unwanted pregnancies also, literally, harm women. If true, then 
women bearing unwanted pregnancies are faced with two injuries—the preg-
nancy itself and the abortion that would end it. Antiabortion activists, and the 
Court, would need to articulate a basis for compelling women to remain injured 
(that is, pregnant) in order to protect them from a harm (that is, abortion). 
Moreover, if unwanted pregnancy is an injury, then perhaps abortion does not 
harm women but rather heals them. Which is to say, recent developments in 
antiabortion argumentation counsel the retrieval of the claim that unwanted 
pregnancies are injuries to women; the sexual assault laws under analysis are a 
means to legitimize this claim.  
The exploration proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an overview of 
sexual assault statutes that punish more severely perpetrators who cause their 
victims to become pregnant and suggests that these laws are worthy of cultural 
analysis because they define pregnancy as an injury—a definition that is wholly 
at odds with positive constructions of pregnancy. Part II moves the discussion 
outside the context of rape. It contends that the definition of pregnancy as an 
injury does not solely describe women’s experiences of pregnancies that result 
from rape, but describes women’s experiences of unwanted pregnancy as a 
general matter. Indeed, it is the profound unwantedness of the pregnancy that 
results from rape that makes it an injury. Thus, the criminal law gives legitima-
cy to a subversive phenomenology5 of unwanted pregnancy, which may have 
repercussions for how all unwanted pregnancies—not just those resulting from 
rape—are understood in society. Part II also notes the significance of this ar-
gument in light of recent claims made by antiabortion activists that abortion 
harms women.  
Part III looks at representations of pregnancy in other areas of the law, in-
cluding constitutional law, statutory law, and common law. While this canvass 
of the law is not meant to be exhaustive, it reveals that the law frequently em-
bodies positive constructions of pregnancy. This is true even when negative 
constructions might be expected—as when the Court interprets the Constitution 
to provide for a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy. The rare times that the 
law represents pregnancy subversively are when laws index the social effects of 
pregnancies—for instance, the taxing of government coffers to support the 
children and the families produced by pregnancy. Accordingly, while the law in 
these instances represents pregnancy as an injury, the injury is to the body poli-
tic. Thus, the subversive nature of the representation is mitigated, as it does not 
endeavor to describe a bodily experience of pregnancy as an injury. This Part’s 
canvass demonstrates that it is a rarity for the law to embody a strictly subver-
 
 5. In this Article, “phenomenology” is used to refer to an individual’s subjective, 
conscious, usually bodily experience. See HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, DOING PHENOMENOLOGY: 
ESSAYS ON AND IN PHENOMENOLOGY 3 (1975) (defining phenomenology as “a philosophical 
movement whose primary objective is the direct investigation and description of phenomena 
as consciously experienced”).  
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sive construction of pregnancy (that is, one that focuses on a phenomenology of 
pregnancy as an injury), suggesting the exceptionality of the sexual assault 
statutes at issue. Moreover, this Part’s canvass shows that the law, as a general 
matter, fails to reflect the reality of this experience, which is unique to women; 
in so doing, the law has silenced women. Nevertheless, there remains the pos-
sibility that, as women gain access to positions of power in the public sphere, 
their experiences will come to be reflected in law. This Part serves to itemize 
several areas of the law that may be rewritten, and radically so, should the law 
actually listen to women. A brief Conclusion follows. 
Before beginning the exploration, however, it is necessary to lay out in 
some detail just what is meant by the phrase “positive construction of pregnan-
cy.” The positive construction of pregnancy may be described as hegemonic, 
insofar as it is a persuasive understanding of the event that has achieved its per-
suasiveness through cultural institutions such as law, religion, and the media. 
This construction holds pregnancy to be a wonderful, life-affirming, over-
whelmingly good event in the life of the woman (and her family, nation, and, 
ultimately, species). The beautiful—almost beatific—aspects of pregnancy are 
captured in a passage from the French novelist Colette’s L’Etoile Vesper: “In-
sidiously, unhurriedly, the beatitude of pregnant females spread through 
me . . . . This purring contentment, this euphoria—how give a name either sci-
entific or familiar to this state of preservation?”6 
Indeed, positive constructions of pregnancy recognize the magnificence of 
pregnancy as distinct from the magnificence that infants may represent and 
embody: 
Pregnant, we know god, 
this presence inside us 
which protects us 




flowed out around me 
protecting me 
in her own radiance 
for nine whole months. 
 
I was never alone. 
I did not fear death. 
The baby within 
& the spirit without 
were one, 
& I was at peace. 
 
 
 6. Colette, L’Etoile Vesper, quoted in JUDITH S. MUSICK, YOUNG, POOR, AND 
PREGNANT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TEENAGE MOTHERHOOD 107 (1993) (omission in original). 
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Then she was born, 
& fear reclaimed me. 
 
Erica, Erica, 
don’t you know 
that if you can create 
a baby, you can also create god?  
& if god can bloom 
a baby in your belly 
then She 
must be  
with you always?7 
 
Which is not to say that positive constructions cannot recognize that preg-
nancy is physically taxing, occasionally painful, and frequently burdensome. 
These undesirable aspects of pregnancy are not denied within positive construc-
tions of pregnancy. Nevertheless, the experience of pregnancy remains, at the 
end of the day, a good thing. The negative parts of the experience make it bit-
tersweet; but it is always, and in every case, more sweet than bitter. Consider 
the oft-quoted description of pregnancy offered in Muller v. Oregon (upholding 
a law that limited the number of hours women could work in laundries), which 
emphasized that a woman’s maternal functions disadvantaged her, especially 
“when the burdens of motherhood are upon her.”8 Pregnancy is burdensome, 
but ultimately is a benefit to her, as well as a “benefit of all.”9 Consider as well 
descriptions of pregnancy documented in Kristin Luker’s classic analysis of the 
abortion debate and the worldviews of activists both in favor of and against 
abortion rights.10 Antiabortion activists might have the most incentive to ob-
fuscate the bitter parts of the bittersweet experience of pregnancy. Neverthe-
less, they did not appear to hesitate to acknowledge the bitter that comes with 
the sweet: one opponent of abortion rights offered that “it’s a normal thing [not 
to enjoy pregnancy] . . . [because] very often you’re sick.”11 Another admitted 
that, especially in its earlier stages, pregnancy is unpleasant; but “if you just 
stayed with it a little longer, you might welcome that trial very much.”12 In  
 
 7. ERICA JONG, The Protection We Bear, in ORDINARY MIRACLES 16, 16 (1983) 
Copyright © 1983, 1991, Erica Mann Jong. Used by permission of the poet. See also 
MUSICK, supra note 6, at 109-10 (quoting pregnant teenagers’ descriptions of being 
pregnant, including the statements “I like it when people notice I’m having a baby [because 
i]t gives me a good feeling inside and makes me feel important” and “Being pregnant is 
great. I feel sorry for men because they can never feel what a woman does when she’s 
pregnant”).  
 8. 208 U.S. 412, 416, 421 (1908).  
 9. Id. at 422 (justifying such legislation for “the well-being of the race”). 
 10. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). 
 11. Id. at 168-69 (first alteration in original). 
 12. Id. at 169. 
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these descriptions, pregnancy is bitter, certainly. But, always and in every case, 
it is more sweet than bitter. 
What exactly is it about pregnancy that makes it positive? Of what does the 
“sweet” of the bittersweet consist? If pregnancy is sweet only because it results 
in a baby, perhaps pregnancy is not positive at all; perhaps it is babies that are 
positive. However, this answer ignores the importance that culture gives to 
pregnancy as an independent state of the body. The poem and the novel ex-
cerpted above make this clear. Moreover, it would be an understatement of the 
highest degree to describe fetuses within the current sociopolitical context as 
“meaningful.” On one side of the spectrum of meaningfulness, the fetus is an 
“innocent” biological organism.13 On the other side of the spectrum, the fetus is 
“a life”—a value that is distinct from biological life; as “a life,” the fetus is a 
precious, almost sacred, venerated entity.14 When one recognizes the profundi-
ty of the fetus within the current sociopolitical moment, one can recognize the 
profundity of pregnancy: it is the state of the body that nurtures fetuses. There-
fore, pregnancy, distinct from the baby that it produces, may be idealized in its 
own right.15 
It is worth underscoring the particularity of this Article’s argument. It does 
not argue that the positive construction of pregnancy is transhistorical or trans-
cultural. Nor does it contend that the construction of pregnancy as an injury 
will be properly understood as subversive always and in every sociopolitical 
context. Rather, it offers the positive construction of pregnancy as an idea that 
exists with a certain persuasiveness in the present sociopolitical moment in the 
United States. Moreover, the construction of pregnancy as an injury is subver-
sive only because of the prevalence of the positive construction of pregnancy. 
And there should be no doubt that the positive construction of pregnancy is 
 
 13. See, e.g., Eileen L. McDonagh, My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional 
Right to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057, 1099 (1999) (noting the commonly held 
view that the fetus is “innocent”). 
 14. See, e.g., BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES ON PREGNANCY 
AND THE UNBORN 2 (Lee Hoinacki trans., 1993) (“[T]he term life (and a life) has become an 
idol, and controversy has attached a halo to this idol that precludes its dispassionate use in 
ordinary discourse.”). Indeed, Duden endeavors to write a history of the “conditions under 
which, in the course of one generation, technology along with a new discourse has 
transformed . . . the unborn into a life, and life into a supreme value.” Id. 
 15. Analogously, when pregnancy is an injury to the body politic, the injury is not 
simply the costs that the baby imposes on public coffers. The pregnancy has costs 
independent of the baby that it produces—when the public qua government subsidizes 
prenatal healthcare as well as when the public’s interest in protecting and promoting fetal life 
is not vindicated when a woman chooses to terminate a pregnancy. See, e.g., Michael M. v. 
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (interpreting the fact that many teenage 
pregnancies end in abortion as a social problem); OFFICE OF MEDICAID MGMT., N.Y. STATE 
DEP’T OF HEALTH, PRENATAL CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (PCAP): MEDICAID POLICY 
GUIDELINES MANUAL 3 (2006), available at https://www.emedny.org/providermanuals/ 
prenatal/pdfs/prenatal-policy_section2006-1.pdf (describing New York State’s Prenatal Care 
Assistance Program, which is a Medicaid program that provides comprehensive prenatal 
healthcare to otherwise uninsured or underinsured women). 
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prevalent within U.S. society. One can find it in music,16 movies,17 television 
shows,18 and political discourse.  
With respect to political discourse, positive constructions of pregnancy 
tend to be summoned during conversations about abortion. It is important to 
note, however, that a political stance in favor of abortion rights does not neces-
sarily align with subscription to negative constructions of pregnancy—to the 
notion that pregnancy is an injury. In fact, political figures in favor of abortion 
rights typically publically subscribe to, or simply use for political advantage, 
positive constructions of pregnancy.19 Consider the argumentation used by 
then-Senator Barack Obama in the final debate against Senator John McCain 
during the 2008 presidential election. In justifying his support for abortion 
rights, Obama invoked a positive construction of pregnancy: 
 But there surely is some common ground when both those who believe in 
choice and those who are opposed to abortion can come together and say, “We 
should try to prevent unintended pregnancies by providing appropriate 
education to our youth, communicating that sexuality is sacred and that they 
 
 16. See, e.g., PAUL ANKA, (You’re) Having My Baby, on ANKA (Capitol Records 1974) 
(“The need inside you/ I see it showin’/ Oh/ The seed inside you/ Baby/ Do you feel it 
growin’/ . . . / I’m a woman in love and I love/ What it’s doin’ to me./ . . . / I’m a woman in 
love and I love/ What’s goin’ though me.”); CREED, With Arms Wide Open, on HUMAN CLAY 
(Wind-Up Records 1999) (“Well I don’t know if I’m ready/ To be the man I have to be/ I’ll 
take a breath, I’ll take her by my side/ We stand in awe, we’ve created life . . . .”). But see, 
e.g., DIANA ROSS & THE SUPREMES, Love Child, on LOVE CHILD (Motown Records 2004) 
(1968) (“Love child, never meant to be,/ Love child, born in poverty,/ . . . / This love we’re 
contemplating, is worth the pain of waiting./ We’ll only end up hating the child we may be 
creating./ Love child, never meant to be,/ Love child, scorned by society . . . .”). 
 17. The most obvious and most recent example may be Juno, which was nominated 
for an Oscar for Best Picture. JUNO (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2007). In the film, a quirky, 
lovable teenager’s unplanned pregnancy ends well for all parties involved after she foregoes 
her initial decision to have an abortion, instead carrying the baby to term and arranging for 
the baby to be adopted.  
 18. Examples include the widely popular MTV shows Teen Mom and 16 and 
Pregnant, which chronicle the lives of teenagers who become pregnant. All the teenagers 
featured on the shows decide against abortion; most avow at some point that, while 
becoming pregnant at a young age was difficult and changed the courses of their lives, they 
do not regret the choices that they have made. Cf. Melissa Henson, Op-Ed., MTV’s ‘Teen 
Mom’ Glamorizes Getting Pregnant, CNN (May 4, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-
04/opinion/henson.teen.mom.show_1_amber-portwood-teen-mom-mtv.  
 19. The reverse is also true; that is, a political stance against abortion rights may not be 
based on a subscription to a positive construction of pregnancy. It may be based on the belief 
that the fetus is a person in the constitutional sense, and abortion is a deprivation of the 
fetus’s constitutional rights. Former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum expressed this 
position simply: “It became very clear to me that life begins at conception and persons are 
covered by the constitution, and because human life is the same as a person, to me it was a 
pretty simple deduction to make that that’s what the constitution clearly intended to protect.” 
Peter Walker, Rick Santorum ‘Would Urge Daughter Not to Have Abortion Even After 
Rape,’ GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/24/rick-
santorum-daughter-abortion-rape. 
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should not be engaged in cavalier activity, and providing options for adoption, 
and helping single mothers if they want to choose to keep the baby.”  
 Those are all things that we put in the Democratic platform for the first 
time this year, and I think that’s where we can find some common ground, 
because nobody’s pro-abortion. I think it’s always a tragic situation.20  
Here, then-Senator Obama may be read to reason that abortion is “always a 
tragic situation” because, consistent with positive constructions, pregnancy is a 
wonderful, life-affirming, overwhelmingly good event that life circumstances, 
tragically, prevent a woman from appreciating as such. Abortion rights are sup-
ported not because abortion can heal a woman from an event—an unwanted 
pregnancy—that is experienced as a physical injury. Instead, abortion rights are 
supported because a woman’s pregnancy may occur during a time when she is 
incapable of taking pleasure in its inherently wondrous nature. Although arising 
in an argument in support of abortion rights, this conceptualization of pregnan-
cy is decidedly positive.  
It may be important to rebut the notion that pregnancy is constructed nega-
tively in a context that typically is not understood to be subversive: Christiani-
ty. The idea that some strands of Christianity conceptualize pregnancy nega-
tively, that is, as an injury or punishment, may rest upon a particular, 
problematic understanding of the parable of original sin. After Adam and Eve 
ate from the tree of knowledge, God cast them out of the Garden of Eden with a 
message: “To the woman he said: ‘I will increase your labour and your groan-
ing, and in labour you shall bear children.’”21 Thus, the punishment for original 
sin is painful childbirth—not pregnancy itself.22 Which is to say, pregnancy is 
 
 20. Final Presidential Debate (CBS television broadcast Oct. 15, 2008)  
(transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/16/politics/2008debates/ 
main4525254.shtml). Nevertheless, while it is true that those who support abortion rights 
may subscribe to and invoke positive constructions of pregnancy, it may also be true that 
those against abortion rights are more likely to subscribe to and invoke positive constructions 
of pregnancy: during his bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012, former 
Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum invoked a positive construction of pregnancy par 
excellence when describing the depth of his conviction that abortion is wrong. When asked 
whether his opposition to abortion encompassed the circumstance of a woman becoming 
pregnant after a rape, he answered:  
I believe and I think the right approach is to accept this horribly created—in the sense of 
rape—but nevertheless a gift in a very broken way, the gift of human life, and accept what 
God has given to you. As you know, we have to, in lots of different aspects of our life. We 
have horrible things happen. I can’t think of anything more horrible. But, nevertheless, we 
have to make the best out of a bad situation.  
Piers Morgan Tonight: Interview with Rick Santorum (CNN television broadcast Jan. 20, 
2012) (transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1201/20/ 
pmt.01.html).  
 21. Genesis 3:16 (New English Bible). 
 22. 1 GORDON J. WENHAM, WORD BIBLICAL COMMENTARY 81 (David A. Hubbard et al. 
eds., 1987) (“‘To be a joyful mother of children,’ preferably a large family, was a sure sign 
of God’s blessing. Yet the pain of childbirth, unrelieved by modern medicine, was the most 
bitter known then.” (citations omitted)). 
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not fairly constructed as a punishment or injury. Rather, in most strands of 
Christianity, pregnancy is constructed as a good thing—a blessing.23 
It is safe to conclude that positive constructions of pregnancy are ubiqui-
tous and powerful in society; negative constructions of pregnancy exist,  
enfeebled, in the shadows. Sexual assault statutes that define pregnancy as an 
injury, however, have the potential to change this dynamic. 
I. DEFINING RAPE 
Modern jurisdictions vary greatly in the way that they define rape. Howev-
er, most include some mixture of the elements of sexual intercourse, victim 
nonconsent, and use of force by the perpetrator.24 Moreover, many jurisdictions 
divide rape into categories that impose different sentences based on the pres-
ence or absence of aggravating factors. The infliction of a “substantial bodily 
injury,” “serious bodily injury,” “great bodily harm,” “serious personal inju-
ry,”25 or similar category of harm during the course of a rape is one aggravat-
 
 23. See ATHALYA BRENNER, THE INTERCOURSE OF KNOWLEDGE: ON GENDERING 
DESIRE AND ‘SEXUALITY’ IN THE HEBREW BIBLE 52 (R. Alan Culpepper et al. eds., 1997) 
(“Procreation is introduced in the Bible’s first chapter as a blessing. . . . ‘[B]e fruitful and 
multiply’ is the divine gift and blessing meted out to creatures of the higher orders—animals 
and humankind—upon their creation . . . .” (citations omitted)). Moreover, there is the notion 
that, within some religious or ethical traditions, pregnancy is a punishment for female 
sexuality; that is, women’s punishment for having sex is pregnancy. See, e.g., Deborah D. 
Rogers, Rockabye Lady: Pregnancy as Punishment in Popular Culture, 26 J. AM. STUD. 81, 
81 (1992) (noting the idea that female sexuality is punished by pregnancy, which may be 
fatal—or, at the very least, excruciating). However, pregnancy within these traditions is the 
natural consequence of sex, not a punishment for it. When a woman intends to engage in 
nonprocreative sex, yet pregnancy results nevertheless, she is not being punished; she is 
simply experiencing the expected, ordinary result of sexual activity. See Anthony Esolen, 
Editorial, Notre Madame et le President: There Was No Moral Common Ground, 
TOUCHSTONE, July/Aug. 2009, at 3, 3 (“There are plenty of women who do not want to be 
pregnant, and plenty of men who do not want them to be pregnant, but in all those cases the 
pregnancies are the results of intentional actions that have pregnancy as their perfectly 
natural and perfectly predictable consequence.”).  
 24. See 75 C.J.S. Rape § 1 (West 2012). Several jurisdictions have eliminated the 
requirement that the perpetrator use physical force. This elimination has occurred either via 
statute or via judicial interpretation of the term “force.” See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3101 
(2012) (defining “forcible compulsion” as “[c]ompulsion by use of physical, intellectual, 
moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or implied”); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 
1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (holding that the “physical force” element of the sexual assault 
statute was satisfied by the physical force required to accomplish sexual penetration in the 
absence of victim consent); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1962) (defining the crime 
of “gross sexual imposition” as occurring when a man “compels [a woman] to submit [to 
sexual intercourse] by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary 
resolution”). 
 25. When a sexual assault statute provides that a serious “personal” injury, as opposed 
to a serious “bodily” injury, is an aggravating factor, it usually means that the statute 
endeavors to include serious nonphysical harms (like posttraumatic stress disorder, mental 
anguish, or depression) as cognizable injuries, which may not be readily understood as 
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ing factor26 that can elevate a “basic” rape to a more seriously graded of-
fense.27 However, that which constitutes a “substantial bodily injury” is not 
self-evident, and jurisdictions vary in how they define the term.  
Most definitions of “substantial bodily injury” closely track the one con-
tained in the Model Penal Code, providing that “‘serious bodily injury’ means 
bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, 
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ . . . .”28 As such, it is not intuitive that pregnancy 
should be understood as a “substantial bodily injury.” Again, jurisdictions have 
taken different approaches to this question. Wisconsin, for one, has expressly 
included pregnancy in its definition of the aggravated crime of first-degree sex-
ual assault, requiring that pregnancy be treated like a “great bodily harm.”29 
Other jurisdictions allow the factfinder to determine whether pregnancy is a 
substantial bodily injury on a case-by-case basis.30 Courts in these jurisdictions 
have suggested that some factors that would warrant a finding that a pregnancy 
 
“bodily” injuries in the alternative formulation. For a discussion of the significance of this, 
see infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 26. Other aggravating factors include the commission of another felony during the 
rape and the use of a deadly weapon. See RICHARD G. SINGER & JOHN Q. LA FOND, CRIMINAL 
LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 235 (4th ed. 2007). 
 27. For instance, Washington divides rape into three degrees, with first-degree rape 
involving sexual intercourse “by forcible compulsion” and where the defendant “[i]nflicts 
serious physical injury.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040(1), (1)(c) (2012). First-degree rape 
requires a minimum of three years confinement and does not allow for a suspended sentence. 
Id. § 9A.44.045. Second-degree rape, though, which lacks a requirement that the perpetrator 
inflict a “serious physical injury,” does not carry a minimum sentence and does not remove 
the possibility of a suspended sentence. See id. § 9A.44.050. Some states do not differentiate 
rape in this way. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a) (2012) (establishing one class of 
rape that, among other possibilities, can require only “forcible compulsion” or some type of 
incapacity by the victim). 
 28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-901(3)(p) 
(2012) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which, either at the time of the actual 
injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious 
permanent disfigurement, a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function 
of any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the second or third 
degree.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(x) (2012) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily 
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes miscarriage, severe 
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ . . . .”). 
 29. WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) (2012) (defining first-degree sexual assault as “sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person” that 
“causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to that person”). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc) (arguing that rape cases in which the victim becomes pregnant “must be considered 
one by one to see whether the conduct punished by the particular law under which the 
defendant was convicted involves a serious risk of physical injury” and concluding that 
when a defendant has sex with a thirteen-year-old minor, a resulting pregnancy “could well 
be considered . . . a physical injury even if the pregnancy is normal”), abrogated in part on 
other grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
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constitutes a substantial bodily injury in an individual case include the age of 
the victim and whether the victim experienced any complications during the 
pregnancy or its termination.31 For example, in United States v. Guy, the Eighth 
Circuit found that the fourteen-year-old victim’s pregnancy was a “serious bod-
ily injury” because of the excruciating pain that she endured during labor.32 
The court referred to testimony stating that the victim experienced extreme pain 
during her labor “because her young age and small body frame made her physi-
cally unable to cope with the stress of childbirth.”33 Moreover, the court noted 
“that the pain of labor was increased because [the victim] suffered a complete 
tear of the wall between the rectum and vagina, she suffered from facial 
petechia or broken blood vessels on her face, and she suffered severe hemor-
rhaging from which she would have died without medical intervention.”34  
It is uncommon for jurisdictions to explicitly exclude pregnancy as a sub-
stantial bodily injury—although, in the past, some courts have done exactly 
that, reasoning that there is always a close connection between rape and preg-
nancy and, as such, a pregnancy cannot constitute a separate injury from the 
rape and thus cannot warrant additional punishment.35 The prevailing view, 
 
 31. See, e.g., People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008) (Corrigan, J., concurring) 
(“Factors such as the age of the victim, as well as the outcome, duration, or problems 
associated with a pregnancy may make its impact even more substantial.”).  
 32. 340 F.3d 655, 656, 658 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 33. Id. at 658. 
 34. Id. Bolstering the court’s conclusion that the victim’s pregnancy was a “substantial 
bodily injury” was evidence that the victim experienced mental impairment because of the 
trauma of the rape and pregnancy. Id. (referring to a doctor’s testimony that the victim 
suffered from depression and posttraumatic stress disorder, with symptoms including 
“insomnia, hyper vigilance, slow psychomotor retardation, crying, dysphoric mood, and lack 
of verbal and physical communication”). The implication of United States v. Guy is that 
pregnancy may not be a substantial bodily injury for those women whose bodies are better 
able to cope with childbirth (or who undergo an abortion or suffer a miscarriage and, 
therefore, avoid the necessity of childbirth altogether), or who are more capable of coping 
with the mental and emotional fallout from a rape that results in pregnancy. This 
implication—that a judge or jury may evaluate the difficulty of a woman’s labor and the 
extent of a woman’s sadness and/or anger after being raped—may be a bit disquieting, and 
some scholars have expressed their displeasure with it. See Lauren Hoyson, Note, Rape is 
Tough Enough Without Having Someone Kick You from the Inside: The Case for Including 
Pregnancy as Substantial Bodily Injury, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 565, 591 (2010) (“Pregnancy 
has a substantial effect on all women, whether it involves complications or not. Furthermore, 
the effect of pregnancy on adult women is no less severe than on minors. Therefore, 
pregnancy provides grounds for increasing an assailant’s sentence in all cases . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Yankton, 986 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting 
the lower court’s finding that pregnancies resulting from rape could never constitute serious 
bodily injuries because of the belief that pregnancy is “a pretty common, commonly 
understood but unfortunate result” of rape (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court in 
Yankton, while holding that pregnancy was not a de facto “serious bodily injury” that would 
warrant an increased punishment in every instance, held that on the facts of the case before 
it, the victim’s pregnancy could be a “serious bodily injury” and remanded for a 
determination by the lower court whether the perpetrator ought to be punished more severely 
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however, appears to be that pregnancy and the resulting consequences are not 
injuries necessarily incidental to an act of rape and, consequently, can warrant 
an increased punishment if caused by a sexual assault.36  
Some jurisdictions have replaced the language of “substantial bodily inju-
ry” with “substantial personal injury,” which specifically allows for increased 
punishment for the infliction of nonphysical (that is, mental or emotional) inju-
ries. For example, the definition of “personal injury” in Michigan’s sexual as-
sault statute includes “mental anguish.”37 Similarly, the definition of “serious 
personal injury” in Nebraska’s sexual assault statute includes “extreme mental 
anguish or mental trauma.”38 Notably, the sexual assault statutes of both states 
explicitly define pregnancy as a species of “personal injury.”  
Whether pregnancy constitutes a substantial injury warranting an increased 
punishment for a person convicted of sexual assault raises many interesting 
doctrinal39 and practical40 issues. From an anthropological perspective, these 
 
because of it. Id. In so holding, the court rejected the lower court’s finding that pregnancy 
could never constitute a “serious bodily injury” because it was always incidental to rape. See 
id. 
 36. See Hoyson, supra note 34, at 586-91 (surveying jurisdictions’ rape laws and 
showing that while a minority of jurisdictions never treat pregnancy as an aggravating factor 
when grading rape, a sizeable number of jurisdictions take the alternative approach). 
 37. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(n) (2012). 
 38. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(4) (2012). 
 39. For one, enhancements for sexual assaults resulting in pregnancy raise issues 
concerning the fairness of strict liability in grading. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Is 
Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with Retributive Desert?, 32 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445 (2012) (articulating the possibility that strict criminal liability in 
grading may result in excessively and unjustly punishing perpetrators of crimes). The sexual 
assault statutes under discussion exemplify this concern, as they do not require proof that a 
defendant had the specific intent to cause pregnancy in order to convict him of an aggravated 
sexual assault. See, e.g., Hagenkord v. State, 302 N.W.2d 421, 437 n.9 (Wis. 1981) (noting 
that the sexual assault statute “creat[es] a type of ‘strict liability’” as to “specific intent to 
have intercourse”).  
Further, these statutes may be challenged on the grounds that moral luck should play no 
role in the punishment of convicted rapists: the argument is that, to the extent that two 
individuals both intend to rape their victims, they share the same culpability. However, if 
one of those individuals has the “bad luck” to cause his victim to become pregnant, he will 
be punished more harshly then his “lucky” counterpart whose victim does not become 
pregnant. The concept of “moral luck,” raised by Kant and made a topic of intense academic 
discussion by the writings of philosophers Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams, refers to the 
idea of judging the moral quality of individuals by the consequences of the individual’s 
actions, although those consequences may be beyond his or her control. See THOMAS NAGEL, 
Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 26 (1979) (“Where a significant aspect of what 
someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that 
respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck.”). It remains an open 
philosophical question whether consequences over which we have no control should speak to 
our moral character; nevertheless, it is patent that the criminal law frequently considers 
“moral luck” to be highly relevant. See id. at 29 (“[T]he penalty for attempted murder is less 
than that for successful murder—however similar the intentions and motives of the assailant 
may be in the two cases.”); Steven Sverdlik, Crime and Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 181, 
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statutes are fascinating because of the cultural work that they do. To be precise, 
they construct pregnancy and injury as equivalents and, in so doing, create pos-
sibilities for reimagining pregnancy. 
Consider Wisconsin’s approach to grading sexual assaults. The statute de-
fines first-degree sexual assault as “sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
another person without consent of that person” which “causes pregnancy or 
great bodily harm to that person.”41 In grading sexual assaults that result in 
“pregnancy” or “great bodily harm” more severely, the statute can be read to 
link the two phenomena as equivalents. That is, the statute can be reasonably 
read as asserting that pregnancy, subsequent to a rape, is like a great bodily 
harm. Pregnancy and great bodily harm are posited as analogous entities, shar-
ing some fundamental similarity. 
Other states’ approaches do this work more directly. Consider Nebraska, 
which defines “serious personal injury” as “great bodily injury or disfigure-
ment, extreme mental anguish or mental trauma, pregnancy, disease, or loss or 
impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ.”42 Nebraska’s statute can be read 
as stating not simply that pregnancy is like a serious personal injury, but rather 
that pregnancy is a serious personal injury. Michigan’s statute similarly defines 
“personal injury” as “bodily injury, disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic 
pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive  
organ.”43 Moreover, case law establishing that pregnancy could be considered a 
“substantial bodily injury” that aggravates the sexual assault and increases the 
sentence imposed performs the same work as statutes that explicitly define 
pregnancy as a substantial bodily injury.44  
Before turning to the significance of this definition of pregnancy, two 
notes—one on this Article’s focus on pregnancy as a physical injury, the other 
on the legal construction of injury—are warranted. 
 
182 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993) (“[T]he law typically punishes success more severely, 
and . . . it punishes the unlucky negligent person more severely, as well.”). 
 40. Nationally, an estimated five percent of rapes involving victims between the ages 
of twelve and forty-five lead to pregnancy. See Melisa M. Holmes et al., Rape-Related 
Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Characteristics from a National Sample of Women, 
175 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 320, 320-22 & tbl.2 (1996). This amounts to 
approximately 32,000 pregnancies per annum in women over eighteen. Id. at 322. The 
sexual assault statutes at issue result in tens of thousands of perpetrators potentially being 
punished more severely for the crimes that they have committed each year. 
 41. WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) (2012). 
 42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(4) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 43. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(n) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 44. See, e.g., People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 712 (Cal. 2008) (holding that a pregnancy 
could be considered a “great bodily injury” for the purposes of a statute providing for longer 
sentences for defendants convicted of certain felonies that result in “great bodily injury”). 
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A. The Focus on Physical Injury 
If, as this Article contends, the sexual assault statutes under discussion 
construct pregnancy as an injury, it is not entirely clear what type of injury is 
being constructed. That is, the statutes might be interpreted as constructing 
pregnancy as a mental or emotional injury;45 alternatively, they might be inter-
preted as constructing pregnancy as a physical injury. In truth, pregnancy is a 
multifaceted event that affects a woman mentally, emotionally, and physical-
ly.46 Accordingly, a pregnancy resulting from rape—that is, a pregnancy that 
may be profoundly unwanted—may be both a mental/emotional injury and a 
physical injury.47 While acknowledging the nonphysical nature of the injury 
 
 45. It is worth noting that it is more typical for lawyers to speak of mental or 
emotional harms, as opposed to mental or emotional injuries. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 (2010). 
Nevertheless, it is also true that the language of mental or emotional injury is not unheard of 
within the law. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 625 (2012) (noting that 
“[p]risoners bringing federal lawsuits . . . ordinarily may not seek damages for mental or 
emotional injury unconnected with physical injury” (emphasis added)). Although the more 
common parlance among lawyers may be that of mental or emotional “harms,” this Article 
insists upon using the language of mental or emotional “injuries.” This is primarily because 
the sexual assault statutes under analysis generally use the language of “injury”; accordingly, 
if what they recognize are the devastating mental and emotional effects of unwanted 
pregnancy, then they construct pregnancy as a mental or emotional “injury,” not a mental or 
emotional “harm.” 
Moreover, lawyers sometimes distinguish between harms and injuries by using the 
former to refer to a hurt or loss of some sort while using the latter to refer to an event that is 
cognizable and remediable by law. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990) 
(defining “damnum absque injuria” as “[l]oss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense; 
that is, without such breach of duty as is redressible by a legal action”). Nevertheless, when 
criminal statutes speak of “substantial bodily injury” or the like, they are not referring to 
“injury” in this narrow, technical sense—as a legal injury; rather, they are speaking of 
“injury” as a layperson speaks of injury—as a literal injury. Thus, if the relevant sexual 
assault statutes will have an effect on cultural understandings of pregnancy, it will not be 
because they have constructed pregnancy as a legal injury. (However, it is possible that they 
could have cultural effects even if they constructed pregnancy as a legal injury, insofar as 
legal understandings influence culture in unexpected ways.) Rather, it will be because they 
have constructed pregnancy as a literal injury. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 
42-43.  
 46. Because of the physical and nonphysical effects that pregnancy has on women, the 
Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe v. Wade, interpreted the term 
“health” in a Georgia statute that prohibited abortions except those endangering a woman’s 
life or “health” as implicating both physical and mental health. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 
192 (1973) (holding that, when deciding whether a pregnancy endangers a woman’s health, a 
physician’s “medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, 
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the 
patient,” as “[a]ll these factors may relate to health”). 
 47. In other contexts, commentators have criticized laws and arguments that focus on 
the physical aspects of pregnancy to the exclusion of its nonphysical effects. See, e.g., 
Deborah L. Brake, The Invisible Pregnant Athlete and the Promise of Title IX, 31 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 323, 345-47 (2008) (observing that “[p]regnancy implicates women’s identities, 
life courses, and relationships to others in ways that knee injuries and ankle sprains do not,” 
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occasioned by such a pregnancy, this Article’s focus is on pregnancy as a phys-
ical injury—namely because it might represent the more radical reimagination 
of pregnancy.48  
This Article is interested in how the law might affect cultural understand-
ings of pregnancy and might work to legitimize women’s experiences of un-
wanted pregnancies as injuries that have happened to/in/by their bodies. In the 
formulation in which pregnancy is a mental or emotional injury, it is easier to 
disconnect the event of pregnancy from the injury. That is, it is easier to con-
ceptualize the pregnancy and the mental/emotional injury as distinct. In this 
formulation, the pregnancy causes the mental/emotional injury; it is not, itself, 
the mental/emotional injury. In so doing, this formulation may not sufficiently 
destabilize the positive construction of pregnancy. It allows for the possibility 
that pregnancy, consistent with the positive notions, may actually be a beauti-
ful, life-affirming, overwhelmingly good event that is, lamentably, misrecog-
nized by the woman—thereby causing her mental/emotional injury.  
In the alternate formulation, in which the statutes are interpreted to con-
struct pregnancy as a physical injury, it is much more difficult to distinguish the 
event of pregnancy and the injury. It would be nonsensical to say that pregnan-
cy causes the physical injury. Rather, the formulation forces the conclusion that 
pregnancy is the physical injury. If pregnancy is the injury, it becomes much 
more difficult to claim that it is beautiful, life-affirming, overwhelmingly good, 
and so forth. In this way, the formulation represents a profound rejection of the 
positive construction of pregnancy. Further, it may better resonate with the 
phenomenology of unwanted pregnancy, which, not uncommonly, is experi-
enced by the woman bearing it as a betrayal of the body.49 
In focusing on pregnancy as a physical injury, this Article might be ac-
cused of continuing the problematized privileging of physical over emotional 
injuries in the civil and criminal law.50 Accordingly, this Article’s focus may 
 
and arguing that when pregnancy is analogized to other disabilities in judicial or legislative 
efforts to determine what precisely “equal,” nondiscriminatory treatment is, the analogy 
obfuscates the “social and relational aspects of pregnancy”); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and 
Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
329, 364 (2010) (“Pregnancy itself, when unwanted, involves both a bodily invasion and a 
forced social relationship of caretaking.”). 
 48. It is likely that the legislators and judges who are open to treating pregnancy as a 
substantial bodily injury that can aggravate a rape conceptualize pregnancy as a species of 
mental or emotional injury—as a harm to a woman’s identity or dignity. See discussion infra 
Part II.B. However, this conceptualization of pregnancy is likely accepted precisely because 
it does not trouble positive constructions of pregnancy as profoundly as an alternative 
construction in which pregnancy is understood as a physical injury. The aim of this Article is 
to destabilize, as deeply as possible, positive constructions of pregnancy. Accordingly, it 
foregrounds pregnancy as a physical injury and explores the implications thereof. 
 49. See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 50. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF 
INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) (analyzing the historical privileging of 
physical injuries in tort law). Chamallas and Wriggins observe that courts were reluctant to 
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not challenge the male norm of what counts as a “real” injury, thereby  
submerging the mental/emotional injury that forced pregnancy can inflict.51 
Moreover, it may deny the gendered uniqueness of unwanted pregnancy; by 
conceptualizing it as a physical injury, we may recognize unwanted pregnancy 
as a legitimate harm, but only through stripping it of its gendered specificity 
and treating it as an experience that men can understand.52 Nevertheless, be-
cause of the potential of the physical injury construction to unsettle positive 
constructions, this privileging is accepted.53 
B. The Construction of Legal Injury Versus the Legal Construction of 
Injury 
In its simplest formulation, the laws at issue construct pregnancy as a legal 
injury. As such, they are a small demonstration of the larger phenomenon of the 
construction of legal injury. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine 
the construction of legal injury generally. This is due, in large part, to the 
breadth of the inquiry. To name just a handful of the large number of legal inju-
 
recognize emotional injuries that were independent of a physical injury (or the narrow 
escape of a physical injury), due to the purported difficulty in verifying the genuineness of 
emotional injuries, as well as the belief that emotional injuries were not as serious as 
physical injuries. Id. at 90. The refusal to recognize emotional injuries had the effect of 
ignoring harms of the types often suffered by women. See id. passim. 
While the Third Restatement of Torts, the most recent revision, recognizes purely 
emotional injuries, it is notable that the drafters, after debate, decided to maintain the 
distinction between emotional and physical injuries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).  
 51. As Jennifer Hendricks notes, most unwanted pregnancies are unwanted primarily 
because of their nonphysical implications rather than physical burden. See Hendricks, supra 
note 47, at 351-52 (“[T]he physical burden of normal pregnancy, while substantial, is not 
what prompts most abortions. . . . Women’s reasons for having abortions have much more to 
do with the life-altering arrival of a(nother) baby than with morning sickness or the risk of 
eclampsia.” (footnote omitted)). 
 52. Analogues of this argument were made in the debates surrounding how pregnancy 
should be treated within antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending 
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
1118, 1147 (1986) (presenting the view of many special treatment proponents that 
“pregnancy is indeed distinct from any other human condition, and that it is neither 
necessary, desirable, nor possible to eliminate this biologically rooted sex difference”); 
Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special 
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 326-27 (1984-1985) (noting that 
critics of the argument that pregnancy should not be afforded special, or preferential, 
treatment, but should be afforded the same treatment as other disabilities, believe that such a 
paradigm “precludes recognition of pregnancy’s uniqueness, and thus creates for women a 
Procrustean bed—pregnancy will be treated as if it were comparable to male conditions 
when it is not, thus forcing pregnant women into a workplace structure designed for men”).  
 53. Relatedly, Hendricks writes that “feminists should avoid bifurcating pregnancy 
into physical and social components. Any . . . analysis should include both aspects, or, if 
focused on only one aspect, should acknowledge its incompleteness.” Hendricks, supra note 
47, at 373. This should serve as this Article’s acknowledgment.  
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ries, there are “constitutional injuries,”54 “injuries to property,”55 “injuries to 
the market,”56 and “environmental injuries.”57 Criminal law and tort law add 
physical and mental/emotional injuries58 as legal injuries.59 Moreover, much 
energy is spent, in practice and in academia, advocating for the recognition of 
certain phenomena as legal injuries.60 One could argue that, as a general matter, 
identifying legal injuries and providing remedies for them are primary func-
tions of the law. Thus, there is nothing exceptional insofar as the sexual assault 
statutes at issue are involved in the work of constructing a legal injury. What 
may be exceptional, however, is that the law in this instance constructs preg-
nancy as a legal injury. 
However, the claim in this Article is much broader: the purpose is not 
simply to note that the statutes under discussion construct pregnancy as a legal 
injury, but rather to argue that these laws construct pregnancy as a literal inju-
ry.61 The concern lies not with the construction of legal injury, but instead with 
the legal construction of injury. 
 
 54. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306, 313-14 (2000) 
(holding that a Texas school district’s policy that allowed the delivery of an “invocation 
and/or message” at football games violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, 
and arguing that the Court is not only concerned “with the serious constitutional injury that 
occurs when a student is forced to participate in an act of religious worship,” but is also 
concerned with “other different, yet equally important, constitutional injuries” (emphases 
added) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  
 55. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (establishing the oft-quoted 
principle that “not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action” is a 
“‘taking’ in the constitutional sense” (emphasis added)). 
 56. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 328 (1996) (noting the concept of “injury to the market” in the context of copyright 
infringement and the harm that a copyright holder suffers).  
 57. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (making the oft-
quoted observation that “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately 
remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration” (emphasis 
added)).  
 58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 59. It bears noting that the criminal law recognizes a species of mental injury insofar 
as it provides that the perpetrator of an assault need only have intended to cause fear of 
causing serious bodily harm. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(c) (1962) (defining 
simple assault as “attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious 
bodily injury”). 
 60. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 457-76 (arguing that racist speech should be 
recognized as a legal injury, undeserving of protection under the First Amendment); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Commentary, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 
325 (1984) (arguing that pornography should be recognized as a legal injury to women 
inasmuch as it is a “form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an institution of gender 
inequality”). 
 61. It appears to be quite counterintuitive to conceptualize pregnancy as a literal 
injury: at the beginning of a yoga class that the author attended recently, the instructor asked 
if anyone preparing to take the class had any injuries about which she should know. One 
man offered that he was suffering from a pulled hamstring muscle. One woman offered that 
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To elaborate: that which may be regarded as an injury is not independent of 
social and cultural context. An injury is not an objective fact that exists “out 
there” in the world; rather, it is a social construction.62 Accordingly, what may 
be understood as an injury, and commonsensically so, in one sociocultural con-
text may be apprehended as a non-event in another sociocultural context.63 Ad-
ditionally, individuals may have different understandings of injury in the same 
sociocultural context. Nevertheless, the point is that injuries have to be socially 
constructed. Moreover, the law, as a social institution, is a mechanism for that 
social construction. In the instant case, the law constructs pregnancy as an inju-
ry. The law constructs pregnancy such that it occupies the same ontological 
category as a broken bone, or a concussion, or a gunshot wound. 
When a phenomenon, whatever it may be, is constructed as an “injury,” a 
set of meanings for understanding that phenomenon closely follows. Everyone 
knows what it is like to have been injured. We know how injuries look (when 
they are physical) and feel. We know that we may justifiably feel anger toward 
the injurer—even when we are the ones who have injured ourselves. We know 
that physical and mental pain frequently coexist; sadness commonly and rea-
sonably accompanies the bodily pain. We know that injury is something from 
which we must heal. Moreover, we know that while we may learn from inju-
ries, we may comfortably place them in the category of “bad” things that hap-
pen to us; they are negative things that we may profitably avoid. 
When pregnancy is constructed as an injury, we may conjure up our expe-
riences with injury to understand pregnancy. We may understand the justifiable 
feelings of anger toward her “injurer” that the pregnant woman may experi-
ence. We may appreciate the physical and mental pain that accompanies the 
pregnancy; we may expect the pregnant woman to be sad as she “heals” from 
the pregnancy-qua-injury. And most radically, perhaps, we may understand the 
pregnancy as a “bad” thing that happened to the pregnant woman. This is a pro-
foundly negative, subversive understanding of pregnancy. 
The construction of pregnancy as a “bad” thing stands in direct opposition 
to constructions of pregnancy as an inherently positive, life-affirming occur-
rence in a woman’s life. Because of the definition that these sexual assault stat-
 
she was recovering from knee surgery. Then, a woman raised her hand and said, “I’m 
pregnant . . . . Well, I guess that’s not an injury.” The room erupted in laughter. After the 
laughter died down, the instructor clarified her initial question by asking, “Is anyone else 
injured . . . or pregnant?” 
 62. See David M. Engel, Lumping as Default in Tort Cases: The Cultural 
Interpretation of Injury and Causation, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 33, 53 (2010) (“[T]he very 
concept of an ‘injury’ is a cultural construct . . . .”).  
 63. As David Engel writes, 
[I]njuries are not clearly defined social facts about which everyone would agree. An outside 
observer might conclude that a person had suffered an injury, but the individual in question 
might not share that perception. The reverse might also be true—an outsider might not 
perceive an injury when the individual in question is certain that he or she has suffered harm.  
Id. at 46. 
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utes offer, and because of the work that they do to deny pregnancy as an intrin-
sically and inevitably “good” event, they are, as one commentator argues, “in-
compatible with views on pregnancy and the birth of happy and healthy chil-
dren.”64 Moreover, the pregnancy-as-injury definition may justify certain 
approaches to pregnancy—for example, “healing” the woman of her pregnan-
cy-qua-injury through an abortion. In this regard, it is worth noting that even 
those who are opposed to abortion as a general matter are often sympathetic to 
women who seek to terminate pregnancies resulting from rape.65 Indeed, even 
in the statutes that are most restrictive of abortion and abortion rights, abortions 
are generally allowed for pregnancies following a sexual assault.66 These ex-
ceptions reflect the same ontology of pregnancy contained in the sexual assault 
statutes under discussion: a pregnancy produced by a rape is an injury. Accord-
ingly, the woman may justifiably experience the pregnancy as such and may 
justifiably heal herself of her injury by terminating the pregnancy. 
II. MOVING OUT OF THE CONTEXT OF RAPE 
A. On Wantedness 
The sexual assault statutes under discussion could reflect two possible for-
mulations of when pregnancy is an injury. In one formulation, pregnancy is an 
injury when it is the result of nonconsensual sex; accordingly, consensual sex 
produces pregnancies that are not injuries while nonconsensual sex—rape—
produces pregnancies that are injuries. In the other formulation, pregnancy is an 
 
 64. Sabrina Bonanno, Comment, Pregnancy as a Result of Unlawful but Non-Forcible 
Sexual Conduct Is Not a Form of Great Bodily Injury, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 193, 204 
(2009). While this commentator rests her disapproval of such laws on the grounds that the 
term “injury” is not typically understood as indexing a healthy pregnancy, her insistence 
upon referring to pregnancy as “one of life’s greatest gifts” demonstrates that the crux of her 
hostility toward the laws lies in an unwillingness to accept the laws’ betrayal of the positive 
construction of pregnancy. Cf. id. at 204-05 (“Pregnancy does not fall within the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the term ‘bodily injury.’ . . . Pregnancy cannot be considered harmful or 
damaging to the body since it is ‘one of life’s greatest gifts.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 65. Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion 
Debate, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 581 (2009) (noting that many advocates of abortion 
restrictions favor exceptions for pregnancies caused by rape). 
 66. See, e.g., Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, §§ 507, 
508(a)(1), 123 Stat. 524, 803 (prohibiting the use of federal Medicaid money to fund 
abortion except “if the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest,” an amendment 
routinely added to annual appropriations bills popularly known as the Hyde Amendment). 
But see Women’s Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. No. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st 
Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006) (banning abortions in South Dakota and providing no 
exception for abortions sought subsequent to rape); cf. Hendricks, supra note 47, at 336 
(arguing that abortion bans that make exceptions for pregnancies that are the result of rape 
cannot be justified on the moral status of the fetus, as the “fetus produced by a rape is no less 
alive than any other, suggesting that the real concern may be the woman’s culpability for 
voluntary sex”). 
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injury whenever it is unwanted; accordingly, wanted pregnancies are not inju-
ries while unwanted pregnancies are injuries. The latter formulation is the bet-
ter of the two because it accurately describes how unwanted pregnancies are 
experienced.67 
1. Unwantedness as the stuff of injury, or abortion rights advocacy: 
past and present 
A woman bearing an unwanted pregnancy, whether that pregnancy is due 
to rape or not, frequently experiences it as an injury that is happening to/in/by 
her body.68 Indeed, it is the profound unwantedness of the pregnancy that re-
sults from rape that makes it an injury and that makes abortion a healing modal-
ity for that injury. Because it is wantedness that determines the phenomenology 
of a pregnancy,69 wantedness determines, or ought to determine, the ontologi-
cal status of a pregnancy. 
Now, some will contend that the unwanted pregnancy that is the product of 
rape is just different from the unwanted pregnancy that is the result of consen-
sual sex. In the former case, a woman’s body has been invaded twice—by the 
rape and then again by the pregnancy. She must wrestle with whether to carry 
the child of her rapist to term and experience the emotional and physical fallout 
from that choice, or to undergo an abortion and experience the emotional and 
physical fallout from that choice. Admittedly, in the case of an unwanted preg-
nancy that is the result of consensual sex, the woman’s body has not been in-
vaded twice. However, the fact that she may love and be loved by her sexual 
partner—indeed, the very fact that the father of her fetus is not a rapist, but ra-
ther her boyfriend or husband—may make the experience of the pregnancy tor-
turous. She must wrestle with whether or not to carry to term the child of the 
man with whom she may be in love. The pain may be qualitatively different in 
the case of unwanted pregnancies that are the products of consensual sex. But it 
is still excruciating. 
 
 67. This is not an assertion that all pregnancies should be understood as injuries, as 
some radical feminists once championed. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1988) (describing radical feminists’ argument that “[p]regnancy itself, 
independent of male contempt, is invasive, dangerous and oppressive; it is an assault on the 
physical integrity and privacy of the body”). This Article asserts, quite differently, that only 
unwanted pregnancy should be understood as an injury. 
 68. Quite evocatively, Eileen McDonagh describes the feeling of bearing an unwanted 
pregnancy as “excruciating.” See EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION 
DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 193 (1996). 
 69. Cf. Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women’s Equality as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 
(1989) (No. 88-605), 1989 WL 1127689, at *10 n.22 (“[A] woman desiring to carry her 
pregnancy to term perceives the growing fetus as a welcome presence within her body rather 
than an invasion of her privacy.”). 
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Moreover, the argument that pregnancies resulting from rape are simply 
different from pregnancies resulting from consensual sex problematically privi-
leges men’s acts over women’s experiences. A woman bearing an unwanted 
pregnancy after a rape and a woman bearing an unwanted pregnancy after con-
sensual sex may both experience their pregnancies as injuries. To say that only 
the former woman has been injured is to give determinative significance to the 
man who forced, compelled, or coerced her into sex and to deny significance to 
the woman who experiences her pregnancy. If the former woman’s pregnancy 
is simply different from the latter woman’s, it is not because of differing 
phenomenologies; rather, it is because of the derogation of their 
phenomenologies and the privileging of men’s actions.  
Phenomenological accounts of unwanted pregnancies, told by women who 
have borne them, leave no doubt that many women experience and understand 
such pregnancies as bodily injuries even when they do not result from rape. In-
deed, providing these phenomenological accounts was the precise legal strategy 
of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) in Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,70 in which the Court reaf-
firmed Roe v. Wade.71 In an amicus brief, NARAL attempted to demonstrate 
the fundamentality of the abortion right not by recourse to constitutional text or 
history, but rather through women’s experience.72 The brief quoted letters of 
women who described what it felt like to bear an unwanted pregnancy. Women 
described themselves as “terrified,”73 as feeling like “the helpless pawn of na-
ture.”74 One woman stated, “It is difficult to adequately describe the difference 
between a wanted and an unwanted pregnancy. It is sometimes like the differ-
ence between darkness and despair, and light and joy.”75 Another woman ex-
pressed her experience of an unwanted pregnancy as follows: 
Today I am a little more than two months pregnant. My husband and I are 
thrilled about it. Almost exactly a decade ago, however, I learned I was 
pregnant, and my response was diametrically opposite. I was sick in my heart 
 
 70. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 71. Id. at 759. The power of NARAL’s brief underscores the need for more 
phenomenological accounts of unwanted pregnancy. See West, supra note 67, at 66 (“[W]e 
need to explain . . . the harms and dangers of invasive pregnancy. We need to explain that 
this harm has nothing to do with invading the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, or 
the privacy of the family, or the privacy of the marriage; but that rather, it has to do with 
invading the physical boundaries of the body and the psychic boundaries of a life.”). See 
generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological 
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149 (2000) (articulating the need 
for a phenomenology of women’s lives). Indeed, it suggests that an ethnography of 
unwanted pregnancy is necessary.  
 72. See Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellees, Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747 (Nos. 84-495, 84-1379), 1985 WL 669630. 
 73. Id. at *29. 
 74. Id. at *19.  
 75. Id. at *21. 
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and I thought I would kill myself. It was as if I had been told my body had 
been invaded with cancer. It seemed that very wrong.76 
Unwanted pregnancies—even when they are not a product of rape, but ra-
ther consensual sex with a (perhaps) loved and loving partner—are far from 
gifts to the women whose bodies sustain them. They are experienced as trage-
dies—as “cancers.” They are injuries. Consider Robin West’s description:  
An unwanted fetus, no less than an unwanted penis, invades my body, violates 
my physical boundaries, occupies my body and can potentially destroy my 
sense of self. Although the culture does not recognize them as such, the 
physical and existential invasions occasioned by unwanted pregnancy and 
intercourse are real harms. . . . An unwanted pregnancy is disastrous . . . .77 
Which is to argue that the wantedness of the pregnancy dictates its ontolog-
ical status. When wanted, pregnancy is a magnificent, wonderful thing;78 when 
unwanted, pregnancy is an injury. Of course, a woman may have very conflict-
ed, evolving feelings about whether a pregnancy is wanted, and, accordingly, it 
may not always be clear whether her pregnancy is an injury at any given point 
in time. However, it does seem clear that when a woman arrives at the conclu-
sion that a pregnancy is unwanted, the pregnancy crystallizes as an injury.  
That advocates in years past made arguments in favor of abortion rights in 
the register of women’s experience of unwanted pregnancy as an injury is sig-
nificant in light of the register in which antiabortion argumentation currently is 
being made. Reva Siegel has done extensive work chronicling the ascension of 
woman-protective antiabortion argumentation (WPAA)—that is, arguments 
that restrictions on abortion rights and access protect women from harming 
themselves.79 The story she tells is one in which opponents of abortion rights 
once championed their position by focusing on the effect that abortion had on 
the fetus. According to this line of argument, abortion was wrong and ought not 
 
 76. Id. at *28.  
 77. West, supra note 67, at 35. 
 78. Deborah Brake argues that when pregnancy is defined as or analogized to a 
disability in the context of antidiscrimination law, it “focuses on the disabling rather than the 
enabling physical features of pregnancy. The wonderment of the pregnant body, the 
heightened awareness of the body that many pregnant women experience, and the 
anticipation that accompanies the bodily transformation are lost in the comparison.” See 
Brake, supra note 47, at 345 (footnote omitted). Brake correctly describes women’s 
experiences of wanted pregnancies. However, the “heightened awareness of the body” is not 
experienced as a “wonderment” when the pregnancy is unwanted. 
 79. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions 
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1706-35 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity] 
(tracing the origins and spread of woman-protective antiabortion argumentation); see also 
Reva B. Siegel, Lecture, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (documenting the shift 
from antiabortion advocacy that focused on the harm to the fetus to advocacy that focused on 
the harm to the woman); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis 
of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 (analyzing “the 
state’s claimed interest in protecting women from abortion”).  
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to be made illegal because it killed the fetus.80 However, fetal-focused argu-
mentation did not win abortion opponents the result they desired: the sympa-
thies of a majority of Americans81 and the overturning of Roe v. Wade. In re-
sponse, activists adapted their advocacy in light of the criticism that the 
antiabortion movement cared too much about fetuses and too little about wom-
en: their advocacy would now affirm that the antiabortion movement, like the 
abortion rights movement, cared about women deeply.82  
According to the new strategy, abortion should be limited not only because 
it harms fetuses, but because it harms women. The movement argued that abor-
tion was harmful because it led to postabortion syndrome, mental health prob-
lems, increased risk of breast cancer, and a host of other ills.83 Restricting abor-
tion protected women from these ills. Most importantly, WPAA made it into 
abortion jurisprudence: when the Carhart II majority pronounced that it was 
“unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort 
the infant life they once created and sustained,”84 it looked to Sandra Cano’s 
amicus brief, which “provided ninety-six pages of excerpts . . . testifying that 
‘abortion in practice hurts women’s health.’”85 In light of the Court’s ac-
ceptance of WPAA in Carhart II, it is reasonable to expect that it will become 
more widespread.86 Indeed, it has provided the justification for the new wave 
of abortion regulations that burden abortion access through the informed con-
sent process.87 Many opponents of abortion hope that WPAA may become the 
justification for a ban on abortion altogether.88  
 
 80. See Siegel, Dignity, supra note 79, at 1713 (“Without a doubt, the dominant 
argument of the antiabortion movement over the last several decades has been that abortion 
wrongfully ends the life of the unborn. Argument over the morality of abortion focused on 
the ontological status of the embryo/fetus . . . .”). 
 81. See id. at 1715 (noting that the antiabortion movement had “found itself unable to 
persuade a significant portion of the electorate”). 
 82. See id. at 1717 (quoting an architect of WPAA who said the challenge the 
antiabortion movement faced was “to convince the public that we were compassionate to 
women”). 
 83. See id. at 1719 nn.80-81 (noting the purported harmful effects of abortion). 
 84. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
 85. Siegel, Dignity, supra note 79, at 1727 n.95; see also Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159 
(citing Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women 
Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 
05-380)). For a description of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973), see supra note 46. 
 86. See Siegel, Dignity, supra note 79 at 1733-34 (noting the joy with which 
antiabortion advocates greeted Carhart II’s reflection of WPAA and their plans to expand 
their efforts).  
 87. See Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion 
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 261-62 (2009) (connecting the wave 
of regulations of the informed consent process to abortion with WPAA). 
 88. See Siegel, Dignity, supra note 79, at 1734 (observing that some antiabortion 
activists hope that Carhart II signals Justice Kennedy’s willingness to uphold a ban on 
abortion altogether). 
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The relationship between WPAA and criminal statutes that treat pregnancy 
as a substantial bodily injury is one of challenge. Is it fair to say that abortion is 
harming women when unwanted pregnancy is itself a literal injury to women? 
That is, is it fair to say that women are being harmed by a modality that is heal-
ing them of an injury? If abortion does harm women, then on what principle 
can one compel women to remain injured (that is, pregnant) in order to protect 
them from a harm (that is, abortion)? If women are faced with two evils (an in-
jury and a harm), on what principle should they be denied the right to decide 
which of the two evils they will endure? 
The sexual assault statutes under analysis counsel a retrieval of an abortion 
rights advocacy that has fallen out of use and, to some, memory. The phenome-
nology of women’s experiences of unwanted pregnancy as injuries contained in 
the NARAL amicus brief, which never managed to make it into abortion juris-
prudence, might serve as an effective and powerful counterdiscourse to the 
phenomenology of (some) women’s experiences of abortion as injuries that is 
contained in Sandra Cano’s amicus brief for Carhart II, which did make it into 
the jurisprudence. Which is to say: the sexual assault statutes under analysis 
have been on the books for quite some time now, yet have not managed to in-
fluence popular understandings of unwanted pregnancy in the way that this Ar-
ticle suggests that they could and should. The advent and recent legitimation of 
WPAA indicates that we have entered a cultural moment in which it may be 
particularly fruitful for abortion rights advocates to leverage the understanding 
of pregnancy contained in some jurisdictions’ criminal law. Perhaps it also in-
dicates a cultural receptivity to this understanding. 
Now, this is not to argue that if it became acceptable to understand an un-
wanted pregnancy as an injury, those who are generally opposed to abortion 
would, as a matter of course, change their minds and support abortion rights 
and access. Opponents of abortion hold their ideological and political position 
for many reasons, the most important of which may be their beliefs in the moral 
status of the fetus and the deference it deserves as a rights-bearing entity.89 Ac-
cordingly, even if unwanted pregnancy were understood as an actual injury, an 
opponent of abortion may feel that this does not diminish the fetus’s moral sta-
tus or rights. Consequently, abortion may still be wrong because it wrongly 
kills the fetus—notwithstanding the fact that the abortion is done to heal an ac-
tual injury. However, as noted above, opponents of abortion frequently concede 
that abortion may be acceptable in cases of rape or incest;90 moreover, many 
concede that it may also be acceptable in cases where a pregnancy may endan-
ger the woman’s life or health.91 These concessions show that, for many abor-
 
 89. See Borgmann, supra note 65, at 558-60 (noting that those who are opposed to 
abortion tend to construct the fetus as a rights-holding “person”).  
 90. See discussion supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Abortion and Birth Control, POLLING REPORT, http://www.pollingreport.com/ 
abortion2.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (reporting that a majority of those polled in a 
survey conducted from October 23 to 24, 2007 indicated that an abortion should be legal 
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tion opponents, there are other considerations that may override the rights or 
interests of the fetus and may make abortion a tolerable practice. Pregnancy’s 
status as an injury may be one of them. 
2. Nonconsent to sex as the stuff of injury 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to contend with the alternative formulation 
that is possibly embodied in the sexual assault statutes. In this formulation, 
wantedness of the pregnancy is irrelevant; instead, consent to sex dictates 
whether or not pregnancy is an injury. Accordingly, nonconsensual sex—
rape—produces pregnancies that are injuries; consensual sex, on the other 
hand, produces pregnancies that occupy another ontological category.92 
It is undeniable that, in other areas of the criminal and civil law, the ab-
sence of consent transforms phenomena into legal injuries.93 The most obvious 
comparison is rape: sexual intercourse with consent is, simply, sex. In contrast, 
sexual intercourse without consent is a legal injury—rape.94 Other examples 
are readily available: when a person consents to being punched by another par-
ty (in a boxing match, for example), the person suffers no legal injury (although 
he might suffer a physical injury); however, when consent is absent, a legal in-
 
when needed to protect a woman’s mental health). As “mental health” is a capacious (and 
controversial) category, it is likely that even more of those polled would agree that abortion 
should be legal when needed to protect a woman’s physical health. Cf. Jim Kuhnhenn, 
Obama on Late Abortion: Mental Distress Doesn’t Justify It, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 3, 
2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20080703/ 
obama-abortion (noting that health exceptions are “considered a legal loophole by abortion 
opponents”); Final Presidential Debate, supra note 20 (quoting Senator McCain’s response 
to Obama’s statement during the 2008 presidential debate that he supports abortion access 
when the “health” of the pregnant woman is jeopardized: “Just again, the example of the 
eloquence of Senator Obama. He’s health for the mother [sic]. You know, that’s been 
stretched by the pro-abortion movement in America to mean almost anything. That’s the 
extreme pro-abortion position, quote, ‘health’”). 
 92. Some radical feminists have argued that, given the sexism and unequal power 
relations between the genders that structure our society, it is impossible for women to 
consent to sex. See Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment: Toward the 
Optimal Level of Loss, 47 VAND. L. REV. 427, 475 (1994) (noting the radical feminist view 
that sexual intercourse “is so inherently coercive, so fraught with domination and 
submission, that consent to it by a woman is impossible”). If what these radical feminists 
describe is true, then it collapses the conceptual apparatus in which pregnancies subsequent 
to rape/nonconsensual sex are injuries while pregnancies subsequent to consensual sex are 
not injuries. Because pregnancies that result from consensual sex would exist in theory 
alone, all pregnancies would be actual injuries. 
 93. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1962) (“The consent of the victim to conduct 
charged to constitute an offense . . . is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the 
offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense.”). 
 94. See, e.g., id. § 213.1(1) (“A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his 
wife is guilty of rape if . . . he compels her to submit by force . . . .”). 
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jury—an assault—results.95 Similarly, when a person consents to have another 
person paint a mural on his or her home, for example, there is no legal injury; 
however, in the absence of consent, a legal injury—defacement of property—
results.96 When a person consents to the presence of another in his or her home, 
there is no legal injury; in the absence of consent, a legal injury—trespass—
results.97 
With respect to pregnancy, it is tempting to phrase the question as whether 
consenting to the sex that results in pregnancy is tantamount to consenting to 
the pregnancy such that a woman cannot assert that the resulting pregnancy is a 
legal injury. However, as noted above, the claim in this Article is much broad-
er.98 It does not solely claim that the statutes under discussion recognize preg-
nancy resulting from nonconsensual sex as a legal injury. It claims that the stat-
utes under discussion recognize pregnancy resulting from nonconsensual sex as 
a literal injury. 
Thus, the question, when properly formulated, is whether consenting to the 
sex that results in pregnancy is tantamount to consenting to the pregnancy such 
that a woman cannot assert that the resulting pregnancy is a literal injury. The 
question must be answered in the negative.99 It is more accurate to argue that, 
unless a woman intends to become pregnant through an act of intercourse, she 
cannot be said to have consented to becoming pregnant. At most, by consenting 
to sex, she has consented to exposing herself to the risk of becoming preg-
nant.100 This is relevant because, in many other contexts, we do not lose the 
claim of having been injured or harmed by unwanted things that happen to us—
 
 95. See, e.g., id. § 211.1(1) (“A person is guilty of assault if he: (a) attempts to cause 
or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .”). 
 96. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-1.3(a) (2012) (“A person commits criminal 
defacement of property when the person knowingly damages the property of another by . . . 
the use of paint or any other similar substance . . . . It is an affirmative defense to a violation 
of this Section that the owner of the property damaged consented to such damage.”).  
 97. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (“A person commits [criminal trespass] if, 
knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in 
any building or occupied structure . . . .”). 
 98. See supra Part I.B. 
 99. Should a woman consent to the pregnancy, however, it may be fair to conclude 
that she cannot claim that the pregnancy is a literal injury. This is consistent with our 
experience of injuries in other areas of our lives. If a person does not consent to having her 
nose broken, she may legitimately recognize her broken nose as an injury. However, if this 
same person consents to having her nose broken, during a rhinoplasty, for example, it may 
preclude her and others from recognizing the broken nose as an injury. The broken nose may 
be a postsurgery condition, but it is not an injury. Thanks to Susan Appleton for this 
example. 
100. See MCDONAGH, supra note 68, at 66 (“Sexual intercourse merely causes the risk 
that pregnancy will occur, and consent to engage in sexual intercourse with a man, for any 
and all fertile women, implies consent to expose oneself to that risk.”). 
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even when we have exposed ourselves to the risk that those unwanted things 
will, indeed, happen to us.101 
Eileen McDonagh, apropos to the topic at hand, gives the example of rape. 
Simply because a woman wears a short skirt, or walks through a dark alley, or 
invites a male into her apartment at the end of a date, and thereby exposes her-
self to the risk of sexual assault, her conduct does not preclude her from having 
been harmed or injured should the risk be realized and she is the victim of a 
sexual assault.102 This is also true in other contexts. For example, if a person 
exposes herself to the risk of getting hit by a car by walking out into traffic 
without looking to see if the coast is clear, she is not precluded from identifying 
any injuries she sustains as injuries should she get hit by a car.103 Of course, 
there is recognition of comparative negligence in the civil context.104 A finding 
of comparative negligence usually does not preclude an actor from recovering 
for his injuries; it does, however, frequently preclude an actor from recovering 
the full extent of his injuries.105 Nevertheless, the law recognizes that the actor 
has been legally injured, and, most important to the present Article, the actor 
may continue to identify his literal injuries as literal injuries, although his neg-
ligence contributed to those injuries. Similarly, when a woman has exposed 
herself to the risk that she will become pregnant by consenting to sex with a 
man, should the risk materialize and she become pregnant, she may justifiably 
identify her pregnancy as an injury.  
 
*   *   * 
 
 
101. In response to the question of whether a woman who consents to sex also consents 
to pregnancy, Judith Jarvis Thomson famously answered in the negative by giving the 
example of a person who voluntarily opens a window, thereby exposing herself to the risk of 
being the victim of a burglary:  
If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would 
be absurd to say, “Ah, now he can stay, she’s given him a right to the use of her house—for 
she is partially responsibly for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him 
to get in, in full knowledge that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle.”  
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 58-59 (1971). 
102. See MCDONAGH, supra note 68, at 176 (“A woman who puts herself at risk by 
walking down a deserted street alone at night or by behaving or dressing in ways that could 
be interpreted as sexually provocative, still retains the right to say no to sexual 
intercourse.”). 
103. Cf. Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women’s Equality as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, supra note 69, at *16 n.5 (arguing that when 
women’s contraception fails, they “no more ‘consent’ to pregnancy than pedestrians 
‘consent’ to being struck by drunk drivers”). 
104. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1694 (1995) (exploring the doctrines of contributory and 
comparative negligence in the civil context). 
105. See id. (noting that when a plaintiff acts negligently, his recovery against a 
negligent defendant will likely be reduced or even eliminated). 
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In sum, because the conceptual apparatus in which only nonconsensual sex 
produces pregnancies that are injuries is inconsistent with the relationship that 
consenting to risk exposure has with literal injuries in other areas of our lives, it 
may be illogical to propose that the sexual assault statutes reflect this concep-
tion. Instead, the statutes should be read to reflect the notion that unwantedness 
produces pregnancies that are injuries. 
However, even if the sexual assault statutes embody the formulation in 
which only nonconsensual sex produces pregnancies that are injuries, they nev-
ertheless make it more likely that it will become legitimate in the future to un-
derstand all unwanted pregnancies as injuries. This is simply because the crimi-
nal law has accepted that, at times, pregnancy may, indeed, be an injury. The 
sexual assault statutes under discussion legitimize this subversive experience of 
pregnancy by giving the definition and its meaning the force of law. Accord-
ingly, the statutes create the possibility that other areas of law and society will 
recognize the legitimacy of this description. 
B. Defining the Injury 
If pregnancy is an injury, it is interesting to think through precisely what 
about pregnancy constitutes the injury. There are several possibilities. The first 
is that childbirth is the injury. Indeed, childbirth is widely (and many who have 
endured it would argue, rightfully) understood as an intensely traumatic physi-
cal event. There is pain. There is blood. There is also the possibility of death, 
even if remote.106 Accordingly, when a rapist causes his victim to become 
pregnant, and the victim endures childbirth, the argument is that it is child-
birth—and not the pregnancy per se—that is the bodily injury. Indeed, some 
prosecutors (and judges) have made this argument in individual cases, contend-
ing that it was the fact that a rape victim had to suffer through childbirth that 
warranted an increased punishment for the man who raped her.107 However, 
conceptualizing childbirth, and not the pregnancy itself, as the injury produces 
a somewhat perverse result: it would occasion an increased punishment for on-
ly those defendants whose victims choose to carry the pregnancy to term. 
 
106. In 2006, the maternal mortality rate in the United States was 13.3 deaths per 
100,000 live births. See AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE 
CRISIS IN THE USA 1 (2010), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ 
deadlydelivery.pdf. In the United States, the possibility of death is less remote for black 
women than for white women. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION 107-11 (2011) (discussing racial 
disparities in maternal mortality rates). 
107. See People v. Sargent, 150 Cal. Rptr. 113, 116 (Ct. App. 1978) (“Pregnancy can 
have one of three results—childbirth, abortion or miscarriage. Childbirth is an agonizing 
experience.”); see also Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide 
Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 763 (2006) (“Labor pain is severe enough for local anesthesia, 
which comes with attendant risks, and if the doctor delivers the baby through Caesarean 
section, the mother must undergo the danger and discomfort of a major operation.”).  
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Those defendants whose victims elect to terminate the pregnancy, or whose 
pregnancy ends in a spontaneous miscarriage, would escape a harsher punish-
ment. Many—especially those categories of women who become pregnant as a 
result of rape but who do not give birth to a child—may view this as an unfair 
result. 
The second possibility is to imagine that abortion is the injury when a rape 
results in pregnancy. In order to avoid a similar perversion that results when 
only childbirth is recognized as an injury (that is, in order to avoid punishing 
more severely those defendants whose victims elect to terminate a pregnancy, 
while being more lenient toward those defendants whose victims elect to carry 
the pregnancy to term), childbirth and abortion might be imagined as the inju-
ry.108 But conceptualizing abortion as an injury, even if it is so conceptualized 
together with childbirth, might disquiet some—namely advocates for abortion 
rights. This is because the safety and noninvasiveness of abortion relative to 
childbirth has been constantly underscored by supporters of abortion rights and 
offered as evidence that the procedure ought to be readily available to those 
who desire it.109 Accordingly, abortion rights advocates would challenge the 
appropriateness of likening abortion to childbirth in terms of the physical ef-
fects of the two events. As such, there would have to be something about abor-
tion, independent of its physicality, that would make it as injurious as child-
birth. That “something” would have to be its nonphysical effects on the woman 
or its effects on the fetus. It is fair to say that supporters of abortion rights 
would find both of these alternatives disconcerting.110 
The third possibility is to imagine that the physical changes accompanying 
pregnancy constitute the injury. Under this alternative, the injury is not how the 
pregnancy ultimately ends, but rather the fact that the woman’s body must un-
 
108. Nevertheless, one can imagine a jurisdiction that would not consider it perverse at 
all to punish more severely those rapists whose victims terminate their pregnancies while 
punishing less severely those rapists whose victims carry their pregnancies to term. Indeed, a 
state that considers itself a protector of fetal life might find the result just: the rape is 
aggravated because it led to the destruction of a fetus. Moreover, the destruction of the fetus 
may be thought to lead necessarily to the (aggravated) harm to the woman. See Gonzales v. 
Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (contending that abortion harms women by 
claiming that women may “come to regret their choice to abort the infant life,” which may 
result in “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem”). 
109. Indeed, the trimester framework articulated in Roe v. Wade was justified, in part, 
on the majority’s recognition that abortions performed during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy pose fewer health risks than does childbirth. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (providing 
that the state’s interest in the health of the pregnant woman becomes compelling at the end 
of the first trimester because “of the now-established medical fact . . . that until the end of 
the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth” and, 
accordingly, the state may at that point “regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the 
regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health”). 
110. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s invocation of an “antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable 
evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer 
from ‘[s]evere depression and loss of esteem’” (alteration in original)). 
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dergo substantial changes in order to sustain the fetus. Some scholars arguing 
in support of sexual assault statutes that define pregnancy as an injury for the 
purpose of grading rapes have noted the massive physical changes that occur to 
women during pregnancy, offering these facts as evidence of the similarities 
joining pregnancy with other physical traumas that are easily recognized as 
substantial injuries.111 However, the substantial physical changes that occur 
during pregnancy do not happen immediately. While some women may experi-
ence some effects of pregnancy almost instantly, the more extensive effects 
take time to develop, usually several months. However, the harsher punishment 
that is visited upon perpetrators pursuant to the statutes under discussion does 
not depend upon the victim’s physical condition at the time of the sentence. In-
deed, the rape is an aggravated one the moment that the woman becomes preg-
nant, not at some later point in the pregnancy when the woman’s body has un-
dergone massive changes. Accordingly, this conceptualization of the injury of 
pregnancy does not accord with the way that the law treats the phenomenon. 
The fourth possibility is to imagine that the fetus is the injury when a rape 
results in pregnancy. The argument is that it is the fetus—and the body’s 
recognition of the fetus, together with its attempt to sustain it—that causes the 
massive physical changes in a woman’s body during pregnancy.112 However, 
constructing a fetus as an injury represents an extreme departure from popular 
constructions of the fetus. This is precisely the pushback that McDonagh en-
countered to her proposal to ground abortion rights in a woman’s right to self-
defense against the fetus.113 Her polemic required analogizing the fetus to an 
unwelcome intruder threatening the woman with serious bodily harm; the 
woman would be justified in using deadly force against her intruder—and in 
 
111. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 107, at 763 (itemizing physical effects of 
pregnancy); Hoyson, supra note 34, at 583-84 (same). For a remarkable catalogue of the 
physical effects of a normal pregnancy, see Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1579-82 (1979) (noting common bodily changes that occur during 
pregnancy, ranging from nausea and insomnia to carpal tunnel syndrome and shortness of 
breath).  
In In re Union Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, the Nebraska District 
Court supported its argument that pregnancy is a disease that ought to be covered in the 
defendant’s health insurance plan by describing its physical effects on the body and 
suggesting that if any other condition caused such dramatic changes, it would be readily 
recognized as a disease. 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1147-48 (D. Neb. 2005). The court 
acknowledged the contentiousness of referring to pregnancy as a “disease,” observing that it 
could be taken to “disparage the miracle of birth.” Id. at 1147 n.20. However, the court 
insisted upon using the terminology because “[p]regnancy, but for its priceless procreative 
product, however, is a disease.” Id.  
112. See, e.g., MCDONAGH, supra note 68, at 70-72 (describing the physiological 
changes that occur during a normal pregnancy and underscoring that it is the fetus that 
causes those changes). 
113. See id. at 193 (noting pushback to her proposal to ground abortion rights in a 
woman’s right to self-defense against the fetus).  
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expecting the state to assist her in defending herself against her intruder.114 She 
writes that readers responded negatively to this construction of the fetus: “[A]s 
another pro-choice advocate once said, ‘I certainly didn’t feel my baby was an 
aggressor attacking my body. I felt so close to my baby when I was pregnant 
that it is abhorrent to think of pregnancy the way you propose.’”115 This senti-
ment about the fetus reveals what has become a platitude within political and 
cultural discourse: whatever the fetus is, ontologically speaking, it is inno-
cent.116 Accordingly, it is counterintuitive, and “abhorrent” within some cir-
cles, to conceptualize it as an aggressor, an attacker, or an entity wreaking 
harm.117 Similarly, it is expected that it would be counterintuitive, and “abhor-
rent” within some circles, to conceptualize the fetus as an “injury.”  
The fifth possibility is to imagine an abstracted notion of pregnancy as the 
injury. This possibility does not inquire into the physiology of pregnancy. 
Moreover, it is not important how the pregnancy ends—or even that it neces-
sarily must end. Nor does it identify the pregnancy with the fetus that is both its 
cause and its effect. It is entirely conceptual. The injury is the woman’s 
knowledge that she is pregnant, even when the pregnancy has not produced any 
substantial, or even noticeable, physical effects. The injury is the alteration of a 
rape victim’s identity from “woman” to “pregnant woman.” The injury is the 
fact that the woman thinks of herself differently. 
There are some parallels between the argument that an abstracted notion of 
pregnancy is the injury when a rape results in pregnancy and an argument that 
the injury occasioned by rape, generally, is abstracted as well. To explain: 
when prosecuting a defendant, it is not necessary for the state to demonstrate 
that a rape resulted in a “physical injury” to a woman, although, of course, the 
 
114. McDonagh’s argument begins with the recognition that it is the fetus that causes 
the massive changes in a woman’s body during pregnancy. Id. at 6 (observing that a woman 
desiring an abortion “seeks to expel the coercive imposition of the one and only agent 
capable of making her pregnant: the fetus”). Should any private actor cause these changes to 
a woman, she would be justified in using deadly force to stop the actor. See id. at 7. 
Moreover, McDonagh argues that not only is the woman justified in acting in self-defense 
against a fetus that occupies her body without her consent, but she may call upon the state to 
protect her against the intrusive acts of the fetus—insofar as the state protects citizens from 
the liberty-restricting, violent acts of other private actors. Id. at 19 (“[T]he primary purpose 
of the state as envisioned by founders of the American nation is to stop intruders on behalf of 
those they threaten.”). It is upon this ground that McDonagh bases indigent women’s rights 
to government assistance in obtaining an abortion. See id. 
115. Id. at 193; see also id. at 16 (noting that “some may balk at portraying pregnant 
women as being victimized by a fetus”). 
116. See McDonagh, supra note 13, at 1099 (describing the popular view of the fetus as 
“innocent” with “no intention of affecting a woman’s body and no ability to control its 
effects upon her”).  
117. That the fetus is an aggressor runs counter to the construction of the fetus as a 
“life”—a moral, theological, spiritual notion that exceeds mere biological life. For an 
exploration of this notion of “life” and its ability to unsettle abortion jurisprudence, see 
generally Khiara M. Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden 
Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010).  
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requirement that sexual intercourse have taken place refers to a physical act.118 
Indeed, according to certain studies, “between one-half and two-thirds of rape 
victims sustain no physical injuries.”119 Accordingly, the physical injuries that 
may or may not be occasioned by rape cannot account for why rape is consid-
ered a serious crime. Thus, it is fair to argue that the injury of rape—that which 
makes rape a horrific act—is an abstracted identity- or dignity-based injury.120 
To make the parallel more explicit, one can say that the injury of rape, general-
ly, is the woman’s knowledge that she has been raped, even when the rape does 
not result in any physical effects. The injury is the alteration of a woman’s 
identity from “woman” to “rape victim” or “rape survivor.”121 The injury is the 
fact that the woman thinks of herself differently. The injury of pregnancy is 
analogous. 
This abstracted notion of pregnancy as injury is the safest construction in 
the sense that it does not depend on the teleology of the pregnancy (that is, a 
woman is not injured by her pregnancy only at its end) and it does not require 
somewhat countercultural understandings of the fetus. Consequently, this is 
likely the notion of pregnancy as injury that has the most traction with the leg-
islators and the jurists whose work produces the sexual assault statutes under 
analysis. Notably, this conceptualization of the injury sounds a lot like a mental 
or emotional injury. It is worth interrogating why it is “safest” to construct a 
mental/emotional injury out of pregnancy. Indeed, if physical injuries (like all 
injuries) do not exist “out there” in the world and are, instead, socially con-
 
118. See, e.g., 75 C.J.S. Rape § 15 (West 2012) (“Other than penetration of the female 
sex organ by the male sex organ, infliction of physical injury is not an element of the offense 
of rape.”). 
119. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 75 
(Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996). 
120. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of 
Forced Sex, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845, 851 (2002) (describing rape as a “crime against the 
spiritual self”); see also id. at 893 (quoting descriptions of rape as an injury to the heart and 
soul); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the 
Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439, 446 (1993) (arguing that “the site of the inner 
self, the interior body space, is violated” by rape and quoting a description of rape as an 
“injury to the ‘envelope’ of the self”). An impassioned description of the injury of rape is 
also contained in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Coker v. Georgia, in which the Court held 
that punishing rape with the death penalty was cruel and unusual and, consequently, 
unconstitutional: 
A rapist not only violates a victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes 
serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. The long-range effect upon the 
victim’s life and health is likely to be irreparable; it is impossible to measure the harm which 
results. Volumes have been written by victims, physicians, and psychiatric specialists on the 
lasting injury suffered by rape victims. Rape is not a mere physical attack—it is destructive 
of the human personality. . . . Victims may recover from the physical damage of knife or 
bullet wounds, or a beating with fists or a club, but recovery from such a gross assault on the 
human personality is not healed by medicine or surgery. 
433 U.S. 584, 611-12 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
121. Cf. Pillsbury, supra note 120, at 892 (observing that when rape victims describe 
the injury occasioned by rape, they often speak in terms of a “fundamental loss of identity”). 
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structed,122 then an important question is why it has been difficult for pregnan-
cy to be socially constructed as a physical injury. The answer may lie in the 
subordination of women’s experiences, as a general matter, as well as the per-
suasiveness of positive constructions of pregnancy that are sustained by politi-
cal, religious, and other powerful institutions.  
It deserves some emphasis that the pregnancy-as-injury definition, when 
embedded in statutes and enacted on the bodies of defendants who endure 
longer sentences when their victims become pregnant after a sexual assault, has 
the force of the law behind it. The law imbues this definition with legitimacy 
and power. Of course, individual women experienced their pregnancies as inju-
ries prior to the appearance of the pregnancy-as-injury definitions in criminal 
law. However, these experiences of injury gain legitimacy through their repre-
sentation in the powerful cultural institution that is the law. The significance of 
the historically male institution of the law reflecting an experience that is pro-
foundly female should not be understated: there arguably is no other area of the 
law that reflects a phenomenology—an experience of the body—that is singu-
larly female.123  
While this Part has argued that the representation of pregnancy contained 
in sexual assault statutes that treat it as a substantial bodily injury accurately 
reflects women’s experience of unwanted pregnancy as a general matter, the 
next Part looks to other areas of law where pregnancy is represented in order to 
see whether they, too, accurately reflect women’s experience of unwanted 
pregnancy. The canvass reveals the sexual assault statutes to be exceptional in 
that regard, as the areas of law canvassed remain committed to representing 
pregnancy positively. This should be no surprise: the positive construction of 
pregnancy has remained hegemonic in large part because of its reflection in 
powerful institutions like the law. The areas of law canvassed have undoubted-
ly influenced culture. As such, the law, acting in concert with other forces, has 
produced a culture that now largely accepts as legitimate only those experienc-
es of pregnancy that are consistent with positive constructions of pregnancy; 
this same culture influences the law such that the law will only reflect positive 
constructions of pregnancy. And the dialectic turns. The analyzed sexual as-
sault statutes disseminate a subversive construction of pregnancy and, in that 
way, powerfully interrupt the dialectic. 
III. OTHER CONTEXTS 
This Part considers other areas of law in which pregnancy is represented. It 
reveals that the sexual assault statues under discussion are somewhat excep-
 
122. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
123. See West, supra note 67, at 31 (noting that the danger and fear of unwanted 
pregnancy is “gender-specific” and stating that “[i]t is a fear which grips women, 
distinctively, and it is a fear about which men, apparently, know practically nothing”).  
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tional because it is rare for the law to embrace and reflect subversive under-
standings of pregnancy. The consideration begins with areas of law in which it 
is surprising that pregnancy is not constructed as an injury: abortion jurispru-
dence and birth-related torts. This analysis demonstrates that the law frequently 
embodies positive constructions of pregnancy even when negative construc-
tions might be expected. The Part next considers areas of law in which preg-
nancy is constructed as an injury. However, this representation of pregnancy as 
an injury occurs when laws index the social effects of pregnancies. According-
ly, while the law in these instances represents pregnancy as an injury, the injury 
is to the body politic. Thus, the representation’s subversiveness is mitigated, as 
it does not endeavor to describe a bodily experience of pregnancy as an injury. 
It only seeks to represent the societal effects of pregnancies—usually borne by 
problematized women (that is, minors and the poor).  
This Article does not contend that the two conceptualizations are mutually 
exclusive. It does not argue that when pregnancy is recognized as an injury to 
the body politic, it is never recognized as an injury to the woman, and vice ver-
sa. Instead, the two conceptualizations may be poles on a spectrum, and judicial 
and legislative treatment of pregnancy may fall in a shade of gray in between. 
However, it is also true that the weight of any particular treatment of pregnancy 
is usually toward one pole—and usually dramatically so. Thus, the schematiza-
tion offered in this Article remains valuable, as it demonstrates the uniqueness 
of the sexual assault laws in their unhedged and unapologetic construction of 
pregnancy as an injury. 
Moreover, it is significant that the law, as a general matter, refuses to rec-
ognize that pregnancy can be an injury to women: in so doing, it refuses to re-
flect a critical, yet common aspect of women’s experiences. Indeed, the law has 
ignored, or silenced, countless women because of its enduring commitment to 
positive constructions of pregnancy. Perhaps it is inevitable that, as women 
gain more power in the public sphere, the subversive construction of pregnancy 
will be reflected in law; as women’s voices are heard and respected, the law 
will come to reflect their truths. Perhaps the reflection of this truth in the sexual 
assault laws discussed is a foreshadowing of things to come. If so, it will be  
interesting to observe how the recognition that pregnancy is an injury when 
unwanted may unsettle bodies of law—like abortion jurisprudence and birth-
related torts—that, arguably, remain stunted due to their failure to listen to 
women.  
A. When Pregnancy Is Not an Injury 
1. The abortion cases 
Intuitively, it would seem like the abortion cases would offer the most sub-
versive understandings of pregnancy. After all, they constitutionalize the right 
of a woman who experiences her pregnancy as an injury to terminate that same 
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pregnancy. Undeniably, then, the abortion cases certainly contain some recog-
nition by the law that pregnancy is not always a life-affirming event in the life 
of the woman; instead, pregnancy may be experienced as a bad thing. Howev-
er, the decisions themselves are reluctant to say as much. They are, at best, am-
bivalent. 
The most ambivalent of all of the abortion cases that remain good law is 
Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II).124 In Carhart II, the Court upheld the federal 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, which prohibited a particular method of per-
forming second- and third-trimester abortions. The Court reasoned that the Act 
was a legitimate exercise of a government interested in “promot[ing] respect 
for life, including life of the unborn.”125 
According to the majority opinion, pregnancy establishes a woman as a 
mother—an identity a woman occupies even after she has successfully under-
gone an abortion and has no child.126 Most importantly, her decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy—motivated as it is by all the reasons of which the majority 
was surely well aware—is frequently one that she regrets.127 It is a decision 
that she all too often bemoans, that hurts her, despite the compelling reasons 
that led her to undergo an abortion during her second or third trimester of preg-
nancy.128 As such, the story that Carhart II tells is one in which pregnancy, 
consistent with positive notions, is a burdensome, painful, and anxiety-
producing, but nevertheless good, thing for a woman. The opinion suggests that 
it is the misrecognition of the goodness of the thing—the miscalculation of the 
bitter versus the sweet—that leads women to choose abortion. Moreover, it is a 
miscalculation that women realize after the fact, resulting in regret and depres-
sion. Nevertheless, as an “abortion case” that applied the principles set out in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey129 and, in so do-
ing, implicitly affirmed Casey as good law and perpetuated the abortion 
 
124. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
125. Id. at 158. 
126. See id. at 159-60 (referring to a “mother” who “comes to regret her choice to 
abort”). 
127. Id. at 159 (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life 
they once created and sustained.”). 
128. Many of the abortions proscribed by the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
would be sought because of fetal anomalies that are detected during later stages of pregnancy 
or medical conditions that come to threaten the health of the woman as the pregnancy 
progresses. See Hendricks, supra note 47, at 369 (“In [some] pre-viability cases [where the 
procedure was used], and in all post-viability cases, the need for abortion is triggered by fetal 
deformities or by a threat to the pregnant woman’s life or health.”). This is interesting 
because, but for these medical concerns, many of these pregnancies would be wanted 
pregnancies. See id. (“[M]any of the abortions to which the federal ban applies involve 
wanted pregnancies.”). Thus, Carhart II functions to make it more difficult for women to 
terminate pregnancies that are experienced positively, but are nonetheless physical injuries to 
the woman.  
129. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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right,130 Carhart II could be apprehended as implicitly offering a subversive 
notion of pregnancy. However, the text and the reasoning of the opinion itself 
explicitly offer a representation of pregnancy that is consistent with prevailing, 
positive constructions.  
Now, because the concern here is with discourse and culture, the text of the 
opinion may not matter at all. One may argue that, when the interest is in the 
dissemination of ideas into and throughout culture, it is more important what 
the opinion establishes, not what the opinion says. The argument is that culture 
is not produced by the words that a court or a legislative body uses, but rather 
by the ideas that the laws produced by the court or legislative body manage to 
embody. Accordingly, Carhart II’s ontology of pregnancy (as a positive event) 
would be unimportant; most important would be that, because the Court did not 
use Carhart II as an opportunity to overrule Roe, Carhart II embodies the idea 
that abortion has some constitutional protection and, in so doing, simultaneous-
ly embodies the idea that pregnancy may be a “bad” thing—an injury—for 
some women. Nevertheless, while this may be true, it is also true that Carhart 
II, in its refusal to afford constitutional protection for a particular method of 
performing abortion, limits the abortion right and, in so doing, embodies the 
idea that abortion may be a bad thing for women. This is the messiness of cul-
ture—where discourses and counterdiscourses exist side by side. 
Like Carhart II, Casey plays a prominent role in the messiness of culture 
through its perpetuation of a discourse and counterdiscourse simultaneously. 
Decided nineteen years after Roe, Casey overturned Roe’s much-criticized tri-
mester framework and replaced it with the undue burden standard.131 While 
Roe’s trimester framework had prevented governments from regulating abor-
tion during the first trimester,132 Casey’s undue burden standard allowed for 
the government to regulate abortion during all stages of pregnancy in order to 
promote fetal life.133 So, on the one hand, Casey reaffirmed Roe,134 thus con-
tinuing the constitutionalization of the abortion right and, as a result, embody-
ing and disseminating the idea that pregnancy is, at times, an injurious, “bad” 
 
130. The most dramatic demonstration of Carhart II’s ambivalence toward the 
continuation of Casey as good law is the majority’s refusal to explicitly say as much, and its 
decision to instead “assume” the principles that Casey stated for the purpose of deciding the 
case before it. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 146 (stating that the Court “assume[s] the 
following principles for the purposes of this opinion” and then outlining the holdings of 
Casey). 
131. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the trimester framework 
and stating that the undue burden standard should be used to adjudicate the constitutionality 
of abortion regulations).  
132. See id. at 872 (noting that under the trimester framework, “almost no regulation at 
all is permitted during the first trimester of pregnancy”). 
133. See id. at 878 (noting that the undue burden standard allows the state, “throughout 
pregnancy,” to regulate abortion in the pursuit of convincing the woman to elect childbirth 
over abortion). 
134. Id. at 846 (majority opinion) (reaffirming Roe’s “essential holding”). 
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thing for some women. On the other hand, Casey limited the abortion right135 
and, as a result, embodied and disseminated a competing idea that pregnancy is 
not an injurious, “bad” thing for as many women as Roe allowed.136 
Casey participates in the messiness of culture because it is a profoundly 
ambiguous decision. It certainly acknowledges that women may experience 
their pregnancies as injuries.137 However, it also disbelieves the correctness of 
that experience in many cases. The thrust of Casey is to assert that women 
would actually experience their bodies differently if given the proper infor-
mation.138 Accordingly, it overturns Roe to the extent that the trimester frame-
work prohibited the state from providing women with a lens through which 
they could see that what they thought was an injury was actually a gift.139 In-
deed, Roe is overturned because it proscribed states from attempting to refig-
ure, to reconstitute, the phenomenologies that women have of their bodies. As 
such, Casey’s ambiguity is that it simultaneously recognizes women’s negative 
experiences of pregnancy while being profoundly suspicious of them. Nonethe-
 
135. It is worth noting that the limitation of the abortion right that Casey effected was 
precisely to allow states to compel women who were experiencing their pregnancies 
subversively to hear positive descriptions of their pregnancies. See id. at 872 (plurality 
opinion) (“Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations 
designed to encourage [women] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of 
great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full 
term . . . .”). 
136. Id. at 873, 876 (rejecting Roe’s trimester framework and replacing it with the 
undue burden standard, which, unlike the trimester framework, allows the state to place a 
burden on the woman’s right to decide whether to undergo an abortion, as long as the burden 
is not undue). 
137. Id. at 852 (majority opinion) (noting the “suffering” that may accompany a 
pregnancy). 
138. Moreover, Casey articulates a concern—taken to the extreme in Carhart II—that 
women who experience their pregnancies as injuries would actually be injured by the 
abortion if they were to terminate a pregnancy without having heard information that would 
reveal their pregnancies to be, in actuality, positive. Id. at 882 (plurality opinion) (“In 
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State 
[by mandating that women receive specific information during the informed consent 
process] furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an 
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her 
decision was not fully informed.”); cf. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 159-
60 (2007) (“The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is 
self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief 
more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she 
once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-
developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.”). 
139. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73 (plurality opinion) (overturning Roe’s trimester 
framework, thereby enabling states to pass laws that would require women to hear moral 
perspectives on the fetus, as well as to establish “procedures and institutions to allow 
adoption of unwanted children” and state assistance programs for women who choose to 
retain custody).  
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less, it reaffirms the abortion right because women must “ultimately” determine 
the ontology of their pregnancy.140 
Then, there is the text of the opinion. In the course of refashioning the 
abortion right, the Casey majority waxed philosophically about pregnancy: 
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical 
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. . . . [T]hese sacrifices have from 
the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that 
ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of 
love . . . .141 
The Court here acknowledges that pregnancy is burdensome and painful—
both mentally and physically. However, it is ultimately a blessing, producing an 
“infant” with whom the woman shares a “bond of love.” Indeed, for the Court, 
pregnancy is a noble event. The Court in this passage appears to suggest that 
women suffer, both physically and mentally, during all pregnancies—including 
wanted ones. The Court is loath, however, to interpret the Constitution such 
that the state may compel women to endure this inherent suffering by proscrib-
ing abortion. 
Moreover, even when the Court appears to acknowledge discourses that 
run counter to its positive description, the acknowledgment remains ambiva-
lent: 
One view [of abortion] is based on such reverence for the wonder of creation 
that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term no matter 
how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-being. 
Another is that the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is 
a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent.142 
The Court initially appears to offer the second portrayal of pregnancy as 
conflicting with the first. However, the two are consistent: in both, pregnancy is 
a “wonder of creation”—a beautiful, life-affirming event. The difference is that 
the second portrayal admits that circumstance may prevent women from appre-
ciating the event. A truly destabilizing description of pregnancy would 
acknowledge that, when a woman finds herself pregnant and is unable “to pro-
vide for the nurture and care of the infant”—that is, when a woman bears an 
unwanted pregnancy—the pregnancy may be as much of a “wonder of crea-
tion” as is cancer. The pregnancy is an injury. 
Perhaps only Roe v. Wade143 stands unambiguous in its subversive repre-
sentation of pregnancy as an injury. As a decision that represents the constitu-
tional status of a woman’s right to an abortion, it, like the other abortion cases, 
certainly represents an idea of pregnancy as an injury to those bearing unwant-
ed pregnancies. 
 
140. Id. at 877 (“What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, 
not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”). 
141. Id. at 852 (majority opinion). 
142. Id. at 853. 
143. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Moreover, to the extent that text is important where culture is concerned, 
the text of the decision refrains from embracing positive constructions of preg-
nancy. Indeed, the decision is relatively austere—performing what appears to 
be a dispassionate history of thought concerning fetal ontology.144 Further, 
when it arrives at the point at which it must balance the state’s interest in pro-
tecting fetal life against the woman’s privacy right, there is no hint of a culture 
that frequently constructs pregnancy as a “wonder of creation”: 
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may 
be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all 
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of 
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, 
to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and 
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.145 
Here, pregnancy, if not the “specific and direct harm” itself, may certainly 
produce it. Pregnancy causes distress. It brings “psychological harms” and “dif-
ficulties.” Indeed, Roe represents pregnancy subversively. And indeed, this 
may explain, at least in part, both its veneration and its condemnation.  
Moreover, it is perhaps because Roe unambiguously represents pregnancy 
as an injury that abortion figures as a healing modality in the opinion. Abortion 
is something that, after a thorough consultation and conversation, a doctor pre-
scribes, like a medicine, to a patient.146 Further, once effected, abortion “heals” 
the woman of the mental, emotional, financial, social, and physical burdens that 
the paragraph quoted above references.  
 
144. See id. at 130-47 (surveying the answers that intellectuals have given to the 
question of when life begins by examining the approach taken to abortion in “ancient 
attitudes,” “the Hippocratic Oath,” “the common law,” “the English statutory law,” “the 
American law,” “the position of the American Medical Association,” “the position of the 
American Public Health Association,” and “the position of the American Bar Association” 
(italics and capitalization omitted)). 
145. Id. at 153. 
146. See id. (noting that “the woman and her responsible physician” will consider the 
factors suggesting the propriety of abortion “in consultation”). Commentators have criticized 
Roe’s privileging of the doctor’s interest in practicing medicine over the woman’s interest in 
being free of an unwanted pregnancy. See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Tradition of 
Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 487 (1995); Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: 
Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 
77, 85-86 (1995); Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of 
Reproductive Rights, 88 B.U. L. REV. 175, 178 (2008).  
The Court clearly regarded abortion as a treatment that is prescribed to a woman in Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), a companion case to Roe v. Wade. There, the Court 
emphasized that it is the physician who must decide whether to recommend an abortion and, 
when doing so, must consider “all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and 
the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient” as “[a]ll these factors may relate 
to health.” Id. at 192. 
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Interestingly, while Roe contemplated abortion as a mechanism for healing 
women of a myriad of medical and nonmedical harms, subsequent jurispru-
dence perpetuated this contemplation of abortion only insofar as it related to 
medical harms. Differently stated: the cases that came after Roe, in their 
maintenance of the health exception, recognized abortion as a healing modality 
only when it functions to heal women of medical harms147—a vision of abor-
tion that is fairly described as a retreat from Roe’s recognition of the broad 
range of harms that abortion may heal. To the extent that Carhart II retreated 
from the requirement of a health exception as a limitation on government regu-
lation, it may demonstrate its dramatic denial of pregnancy as an injury in any 
and all cases.148 
2. Wrongful birth/life/pregnancy/conception 
Birth-related torts—which include the torts of wrongful birth, wrongful 
life, wrongful pregnancy, and wrongful conception—capture a wide variety of 
negligent behavior by doctors that results, in one way or another, in the birth of 
a child.149 While states schematize the tort in different ways,150 “wrongful 
birth” usually refers to a cause of action brought by a parent against a 
healthcare provider to recover for the birth of a child who is severely disa-
bled;151 the claim is that, but for negligently delivered prenatal care, the parent 
would have been apprised of the fetus’s usually catastrophic disability prior to 
the infant’s birth and would have terminated the pregnancy. “Wrongful life” 
tends to refer to a cause of action brought by a severely disabled child against a 
healthcare provider to recover for the fact of his or her birth;152 like “wrongful 
birth” claims, the child’s claim is that, but for the negligently delivered prenatal 
 
147. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (confirming “the State’s power to restrict 
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger 
the woman’s life or health”). 
148. See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007) (concluding that 
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act “does not require a health exception”). 
149. See Kimberly D. Wilcoxon, Casenote, Statutory Remedies for Judicial Torts: The 
Need for Wrongful Birth Legislation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2001) (observing that 
birth-related torts “are used to allege that, but for the negligence of a physician, a baby 
would not have been born”). In all cases, the physician is not the direct cause of any injuries 
suffered by the fetus. See Shari S. Weinman, Note, Birth Related Torts: Can They Fit the 
Malpractice Mold?, 56 MO. L. REV. 175, 176 (1991). 
150. See Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1028-30 (noting inconsistencies in the way that 
states schematize birth-related torts).  
151. See Catherine Palo, Cause of Action for Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Life, in 23 
CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND) 55, § 4 (West 2012). 
152. See id. § 10. 
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care, the child’s parents would have learned of the claimant’s disability and 
would have prevented the claimant’s birth through abortion.153  
While most states recognize the tort of wrongful birth, most states refuse to 
recognize wrongful life claims.154 The reason that is usually given for this dis-
crepancy is that the damages for wrongful birth are capable of being calculat-
ed.155 For wrongful birth claims, the injury is the denial of the claimant’s re-
productive rights—that is, her liberty to determine under what conditions she 
will become a parent;156 the damages for this injury are usually the extraordi-
nary expenses associated with raising the child.157 However, for wrongful life 
claims, the injury is the fact of the child’s birth—his or her life itself.158 Many 
courts refuse to recognize life as an injury.159 Moreover, because tort law is de-
signed to compensate claimants for their injuries by putting them in the position 
they would have been had they not been injured, the calculation of damages in-
volves comparing the value of being alive but severely disabled with the value 
 
153. See Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1026-27 (explaining that the injury in wrongful 
life claims is that “the child was harmed by being born with birth defects, rather than being 
aborted”). 
154. See Palo, supra note 151, §§ 4, 11 (detailing the large number of jurisdictions that 
have recognized the wrongful birth cause of action and the large number of jurisdictions that 
have refused to recognize the wrongful life cause of action); Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 
1032 (making the same observation). 
155. Cf. Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1032 (noting the difficulty that courts have in 
calculating damages in wrongful life claims). 
156. See Katherine Say, Note, Wrongful Birth: Preserving Justice for Women and Their 
Families, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 251, 265 (2003) (noting that the injury in wrongful birth 
litigation is “[i]nterference with the patient’s right to autonomy in the fundamental area of 
reproduction”); Weinman, supra note 149, at 177 (observing that the injury in wrongful birth 
claims is that “the provider’s negligence deprived the parents of the choice between carrying 
the pregnancy to term or obtaining an abortion”); Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1041 (noting 
that the claimant’s injury in wrongful birth suits is the inability to make a choice about 
whether to become a parent or not); cf. Julie Gantz, Note, State Statutory Preclusion of 
Wrongful Birth Relief: A Troubling Re-Writing of a Woman’s Right to Choose and the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 795, 815 (1997) (noting that, in a 
wrongful birth suit, the injury may also be conceptualized as “the birth of an impaired 
child”). 
157. See JACOB A. STEIN, 2 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 12:7 (3d. ed., West 
2012) (“The majority of states recognize the cause of action [for wrongful birth] but limit the 
economic damages to the additional medical, hospital, and supportive expense occasioned by 
the child’s impairment as contrasted to the expenses incurred with respect to a normal, 
healthy child.”). As expected, states differ in their approaches to awarding damages for 
wrongful birth claims. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979) (awarding 
damages to compensate the plaintiffs for their “mental and emotional anguish upon their 
realization that they had given birth to a child afflicted with Down’s Syndrome”); Wilcoxon, 
supra note 149, at 1027 n.50 (noting that states may award damages for the costs associated 
with the pregnancy and birth; pain, suffering, and emotional distress; and costs of caring for 
the child even when he has reached adulthood). 
158. See Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1032. 
159. See Weinman, supra note 149, at 179 (noting this rationale for refusal of 
recognition by some courts). 
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of not having existed.160 This is a calculation that most jurisdictions refuse to 
attempt, with the reasons for the refusal ranging from the claimed impossibility 
of the task161 to the denigration of life that the calculation would effect.162  
 “Wrongful conception” and “wrongful pregnancy” are also birth-related 
torts, usually referencing actions that are brought by parents of physically able 
and healthy children whose conceptions or births the parents had attempted to 
prevent.163 Again, like claims of wrongful birth, the parents allege that, but for 
the negligently delivered healthcare, the child never would have been con-
ceived and/or born.164 Most jurisdictions recognize these torts, usually award-
ing damages for the costs associated with the pregnancy and birth; very rarely 
are damages awarded for the ordinary costs of raising the child.165 
 
160. See id. at 178 (explaining the compensatory function of tort damages and noting 
that wrongful life claims involve “measur[ing] monetarily the difference between the child’s 
existence in an impaired state and non-existence”); Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1027 
(explaining that for wrongful life claims, damages “are the differences in cost between living 
with birth defects, and not existing at all”). While most jurisdictions refuse to recognize 
wrongful life claims, those few jurisdictions that do generally decline to make this 
calculation. For the most part, they award damages for the extraordinary costs of raising a 
severely disabled child. See id. at 1027 n.46 (“Traditional tort principles would suggest that 
the child recover for all the expenses of living, but courts are hesitant to award these 
damages. The few courts that have allowed wrongful life [claims] only allow for the 
extraordinary expenses arising from the birth defects.” (citation omitted)). 
161. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) (“Simply put, a 
cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery for wrongful life demands a 
calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson’s choice of life in 
an impaired state and nonexistence. This comparison the law is not equipped to make.”).  
162. See Palo, supra note 151, § 11 (noting that rejections of the claim rest on 
“doctrinal unwillingness to accept that life, even in an impaired state, is worse than non-
existence, or on the metaphysical or the practical inability to measure the value of an 
impaired life as opposed to utter non-existence”). 
163. See id. § 3; Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1027-28 (explaining that for wrongful 
conception claims, “there is usually no claim that the baby has birth defects, but merely that 
the baby was born”). 
164. Typical cases of wrongful conception involve a physician’s failure to successfully 
sterilize a man or a woman, or a pharmacist’s failure to competently dispense contraceptives. 
Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1027-28 & n.51.  
165. See A.J. Stone, III, Comment, Consti-tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run Around 
Abortion Rights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
471, 479 (2000) (noting that courts generally disallow the recovery of damages for the costs 
of raising a healthy child); Weinman, supra note 149, at 179 (noting that most courts “allow 
recovery for medical expenses, pain and suffering during the pregnancy, and loss of 
consortium” and observing that some courts offset the damages awarded by the benefits of 
being a parent). Maine has passed legislation making explicit that damages can only be 
rewarded for medical costs associated with pregnancy and birth and not for the costs of 
raising the healthy child:  
[I]t is contrary to public policy to award damages for the birth or rearing of a healthy child.  
 . . . No person may maintain a claim for relief or receive an award for damages based on 
the claim that the birth and rearing of a healthy child resulted in damages to him. A person 
may maintain a claim for relief based on a failed sterilization procedure resulting in the birth 
of a healthy child and receive an award of damages for the hospital and medical expenses 
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Birth-related torts are interesting because, like sexual assault statutes in 
which causing pregnancy is an aggravating factor, they might be understood as 
constructing pregnancy as an injury—a compensable injury, nevertheless. And 
this surely explains the waves of protest that caused more than a few states to 
legislatively166 and judicially167 bar such claims. However, if birth-related torts 
do construct pregnancy as an injury, they do so only imperfectly. This is be-
cause courts do not attempt to compensate victorious plaintiffs for having been 
injured by a pregnancy that they wish they did not have to bear. Instead, in the 
case of a successful claim of wrongful pregnancy/conception, courts attempt to 
compensate victorious plaintiffs with damages for the economic costs of bear-
ing a pregnancy that culminates in a healthy child. Alternately, in the case of a 
successful claim of wrongful birth, courts attempt to compensate plaintiffs with 
damages either for the exceedingly high costs of raising a disabled child or for 
the mental or emotional harm that parents suffer from having to raise a disabled 
child. Importantly, in neither case does the law attempt to compensate plaintiffs 
for the mental and emotional costs of bearing a pregnancy that is unwanted or 
would have been unwanted had the mother or parents been provided with full 
information. This is a vital distinction. 
Consider Berman v. Allan, in which the parents of a child born with 
Down’s Syndrome sued their obstetricians under a theory of wrongful birth, as-
serting that the physicians negligently failed to inform them of the availability 
of amniocentesis, which would have detected the genetic anomaly in their 
daughter while in utero and would have led them to terminate the pregnancy.168 
 
incurred for the sterilization procedures and pregnancy, the pain and suffering connected 
with the pregnancy and the loss of earnings by the mother during pregnancy. 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2931 (2012). 
166. See Wilcoxon, supra note 149, at 1033 (noting that the reason why many states’ 
legislation prohibiting the recognition of birth-related torts resemble one another is because 
“national pro-life interest groups lobbied for the legislation”). The claim is generally that 
recognizing life, even disabled life, as an injury—and, relatedly, recognizing as an injury the 
deprivation of the right to undergo an abortion to prevent the birth of that life—is an affront 
to the sanctity of life. As one court asserted,  
 Make no mistake. These cases are not about birth, or wrongfulness, or negligence, or 
common law. They are about abortion. . . . For those who cannot accept the premise [that 
abortion is a legal choice for a woman], no one should ever be compensated for injury just 
because the choice of abortion has been thwarted. 
Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., No. C.A. 98-2076, 1999 WL 41875, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 
1999). 
167. A.J. Stone observes that many courts that have eliminated the wrongful birth tort 
have made ideological arguments, “present[ing] the birth of a child in terms of wholesome—
and ultimately overriding—family values.” Stone, supra note 165, at 491. Stone contends 
that these arguments “emanate[] from a judicial contemplation of a society where the birth of 
a child is always a net benefit” and are grounded in the belief that barring the tort evidences 
a “respect for life and the benefits proceeding from it.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
168. 404 A.2d 8, 10 (N.J. 1979). The plaintiffs had also sued as guardians ad litem on 
behalf of their daughter under a theory of wrongful life. However, like many other courts, 
the court held that the daughter failed to state an actionable claim for relief because of its 
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The court held that the parents had stated a claim for damages both for the 
“costs that will be incurred in order to properly raise, supervise and educate the 
child” and for the “emotional anguish that has been and will continue to be ex-
perienced on account” of the child’s condition.169 To the court, the plaintiffs’ 
injury was the pain that they felt and would continue to feel from having a dis-
abled child. Importantly, to the court, the plaintiffs’ injury was not the pain of 
bearing an unwanted pregnancy. (Indeed, the mother bore a wanted pregnancy. 
Her claim is that the pregnancy would have been unwanted, and would have 
been experienced as an injury, had her physicians properly provided prenatal 
care and informed her of her fetus’s disability.) Thus, the court did not inquire 
into the phenomenology of an unwanted pregnancy. As such, the law does not 
reflect a woman’s bodily experience—or a subversive understanding of preg-
nancy. The potential is there, however. Imagine a case of a woman having an 
amniocentesis but, because of physician negligence, she is informed of the re-
sults revealing a fetal anomaly during her third trimester, when legal abortion is 
no longer available. Such a woman might experience the balance of her preg-
nancy, now unwanted, as an injury. Should the law recognize her experience 
and award damages for her pregnancy-qua-injury, it would accomplish the 
same cultural work accomplished by sexual assault statutes that define preg-
nancy as a bodily injury. 
In cases of wrongful pregnancy/conception, in which parents sue after a 
provider’s negligence results in an unwanted pregnancy, courts might recognize 
that the woman who bears a pregnancy only because of the negligent provision 
of contraceptives or a negligently performed abortion or sterilization—that is, a 
woman who bears an unwanted pregnancy—experiences that pregnancy as an 
injury. As described above, courts do not do this, only recognizing the injury of 
having been denied one’s reproductive rights and awarding damages to com-
pensate for the economic costs of the pregnancy. In this selective recognition, 
the law might be read to assert that pregnancy is a positive event. Undeniably, 
there are monetary costs associated with pregnancy that the law does not mind 
shifting. But, ultimately, the pregnancy itself is a good thing. It may result in 
some burdens, which the positive idea of pregnancy freely recognizes. But it is 
not an injury. 
B. When Pregnancy Is an Injury . . . to the Body Politic 
Michael M. v. Superior Court170 is a productive place to start an inquiry in-
to areas of the law that construct pregnancy as an injury—namely because the 
 
refusal to recognize that life, even in an impaired state, could be an injury: “To rule 
otherwise would require us to disavow the basic assumption upon which our society is 
based.” Id. at 12-13. 
169. Id. at 13, 15. 
170. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).  
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opinion is so clear in this construction. In Michael M., the Supreme Court up-
held against an equal protection challenge a California law that made it a crime 
for men, but not women, to have sexual intercourse with a person under the age 
of eighteen.171 The law had been justified on the grounds that it, through a 
purely utilitarian calculus, would “prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies”172 
by raising the costs, via the possibility of a criminal penalty, for males to have 
sex with minor females.173 Females, it was argued, did not need the possibility 
of a criminal penalty to increase the costs of sex because their ability to become 
pregnant was a cost that most females would appreciate as such.174 Thus, the 
“criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly ‘equalize’ 
the deterrents on the sexes.”175 
Pregnancy in the plurality opinion is conceptualized as an injury or harm 
that the female endures.176 Indeed, it is a cost of sex—not a benefit. It is a “pro-
 
171. The law criminalized “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not 
the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years.” Id. at 466 
(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
172. Id. at 470. Frances Olsen has provocatively argued that teenage pregnancies might 
be prevented by changing the conditions under which sex is had—conditions marked by the 
socially-produced inability of women to protect themselves from pregnancy through the use 
of contraceptives. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights 
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 425 n.181 (1984) (“Young women believe—perhaps 
correctly—that using birth control will damage their reputations. . . . The ‘conduct leading to 
pregnancy’ is not just sexual intercourse, but sexual intercourse conducted under conditions 
of pervasive inequality of power and status.” (citation omitted)). 
173. Many commentators have disputed the claim that statutory rape laws are designed 
to reduce the rate of teenage pregnancy, insisting that they are really about protecting 
females from males as sexual aggressors. See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex 
Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 932-33 (1983); Nadine Taub & 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law, in 
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117, 132-33 (David Kairys ed., 1982); 
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and 
Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 185 (1982). 
174. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473 (plurality opinion) (“Because virtually all of the 
significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on 
the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the 
participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences . . . . [T]he risk of pregnancy 
itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females.”). Olsen has helpfully pointed 
out that the minor females who bear pregnancies feel the social consequences of teenage 
pregnancy more acutely not because of biological differences, but rather because of social 
arrangements. See Olsen, supra note 172, at 419 n.152 (“It is empirically true that in our 
present society these burdens generally fall upon the female rather than upon the male, but it 
is important to realize that this is a social rather than biological fact. . . . Social arrangements 
rather than biological necessities cause the consequences of unplanned conception to fall 
mainly on the female.”). 
175. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473. 
176. It is important to note that the harm or injury of abortion is embedded within the 
Court’s construction of pregnancy. The Court noted (quoting the California Supreme Court) 
the “tragic human costs of illegitimate teenage pregnancy” and later observed that 
“approximately half of all teenage pregnancies end in abortion.” Id. at 467, 471 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, while the Court understood pregnancy as “bad” because of 
BRIDGES 65 STAN. L. REV. 457.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2013 5:44 PM 
March 2013] WHEN PREGNANCY IS AN INJURY 503 
found physical, emotional, and psychological consequence[] of sexual activity” 
from which minor females “suffer.”177 Moreover, it is something that a man 
“inflicts” on a woman.178  
It should be noted that, although the events that resulted in the prosecution 
of the defendant in Michael M. may be described accurately as forcible rape, 
insofar as the defendant punched the victim several times in the face before she 
“agreed” to have sex with him,179 the statute at issue in the case criminalized 
all sex—forcible and nonforcible, coerced and uncoerced—that any minor fe-
male had with a male. Which is to say, even wanted sex that would be accurate-
ly described as consensual if the female were legally capable of consent would 
cause the male involved to be subject to criminal prosecution under the statute 
that the Court upheld in Michael M. According to the Michael M. plurality, it is 
not just pregnancies that are produced by violent or abusive sexual relation-
ships that are “injuries” that are “inflicted” on females. Instead, all pregnancies, 
if carried by an unmarried female under the age of eighteen, are “injuries” that 
the female “suffers.” It deserves underscoring that these pregnancies are “inju-
ries” that are “inflicted” even if they are planned or wanted pregnancies. It may 
be stating the obvious to note that this is far from a positive understanding of 
pregnancy. 
However, a closer reading reveals that the plurality in Michael M. is not of-
fering such a negative idea of pregnancy at all. Indeed, it is more consistent 
with the Court’s jurisprudence on pregnancy, as the balance of this Part shows, 
to interpret the opinion as not conceptualizing the pregnancy itself as the “inju-
ry,” but rather offering the negative consequences that flow from it as “inju-
ries.” That is, the Court, in line with positive notions of pregnancy, understands 
the pregnancy itself as always already beautiful and life-affirming. However, 
when the inherently positive pregnancy occurs to an unmarried minor female, it 
has “bad” consequences to the body politic—such as economic instability and 
ultimately dependence180 and abortion (construed as a social problem).181 This 
 
the detrimental effects that it tends to have on the minor, it is also “bad,” at least in part, 
because it frequently leads to “bad” abortions. 
177. Id. at 471; see also id. at 479 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“She alone endures the 
medical risks of pregnancy or abortion. She suffers disproportionately the social, 
educational, and emotional consequences of pregnancy.” (emphases added) (footnote 
omitted)); id. at 482 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing pregnancy as a 
“problem” that women must “confront[]”).  
178. See id. at 475 (plurality opinion) (“The age of the man is irrelevant since young 
men are as capable of older men of inflicting the harm sought to be prevented.” (emphasis 
added)). 
179. See id. at 467; id. at 483 & n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).  
180. See id. at 471 n.5 (plurality opinion) (citing statistics that warn that many teenage 
mothers “face a bleak economic future”). 
181. The Court undeniably appreciates the noneconomic impacts associated with 
abortion as impacting the state. Id. at 471 (“Of particular concern to the State is that 
approximately half of all teenage pregnancies end in abortion.”); cf. Planned Parenthood of 
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is not to deny that a minor who finds herself unexpectedly and unwantedly 
pregnant will experience that pregnancy as an injury; nor is it to deny that the 
Court was likely aware that a minor who finds herself unexpectedly and un-
wantedly pregnant will find it hard to conceptualize the event positively. Ra-
ther, this is to assert that the minor’s experience of her pregnancy as an injury is 
not the Court’s primary concern and does not motivate the Court’s decision. It 
is telling that after the plurality observed that teenage pregnancies “have signif-
icant social, medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her 
child, and the State,” it emphasized that “of those children who are born, their 
illegitimacy makes them likely candidates to become wards of the State.”182 
For the plurality, teenage pregnancies are injuries not because the minor fe-
males who do not want them experience them as wounds that are happening to 
their bodies. Instead, pregnancies are injuries because the pregnancies negative-
ly impact the body politic.  
It is probable that the Court would conceptualize the minor’s pregnancy as 
an injury to the body politic even if the minor experienced it positively—that is, 
even if the pregnancy was planned and/or wanted. Indeed, activists and schol-
ars addressing teenage pregnancy often have to deal with the complexities in-
volved with minors believing that a pregnancy at a young age would be posi-
tive while society believes that that same pregnancy would be an injury. The 
reality is that, at least some of these teenage pregnancies that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a “social problem,” may be wanted. One need only recall the so-
called, and later-discredited, “pregnancy pact” that a group of teenagers made 
at a Massachusetts high school, resulting in seventeen seemingly planned and 
wanted teenage pregnancies.183 Not only were the pregnancies of the minors 
considered injuries to the body politic, but the desire to become pregnant was 
taken to indicate that the minor had already been injured in some capacity—
that something had gone terribly wrong in the minor’s life.184 
Similarly, minors’ experiences of unplanned, unwanted pregnancies do not 
motivate Congress’s problematization of these pregnancies in the legislative 
findings that precede the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion) (noting the state’s “profound 
interest in potential life”).  
182. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 470-71 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
183. See Teens May Have Made Pact to Get Pregnant, NPR (June 20, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91748721. 
184. See id. (noting the opinion of the principal of the school that the pregnancies 
resulted from the fact that “the girls were lonely, and they didn’t have strong families behind 
them,” and the opinion of a reporter that “the girls didn’t have restrictions in their lives [and] 
they live in a town that has been hit hard by the loss of its fishing industry”). Moreover, the 
reporter is quoted as saying, “So these are girls who didn’t have a strong life plan, and they 
decided, essentially, to make their own life plan and take control of the situation. . . . They 
decided if they needed an identity, being a mother would be their identity.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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onciliation Act (PRWORA).185 Rather, minors’ pregnancies, and statutory rape 
more generally, were relevant to Congress only to the extent that they ultimate-
ly come to impact government coffers—that is, because they injure the body 
politic. PRWORA is the legislation that enacted Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), which replaced Aid for Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) as the program that provides monetary assistance to indigent 
families in the United States.186 PRWORA demonstrates what the analysis of 
Michael M. suggests: the law is wholly capable of representing pregnancy as an 
injury when it represents pregnancy as an injury to the body politic.187 Thus, 
the representation, ultimately, is not subversive—failing to represent a phe-
nomenology of pregnancy in which it is an injury that happens to/in/by a wom-
an’s body. 
In justifying the end of “welfare as we kn[e]w it,”188 Congress found that:  
 [8](B) Children born out-of-wedlock have a substantially higher risk of 
being born at a very low or moderately low birth weight. 
 . . . . 
 (D) Children born out-of-wedlock were more likely to have lower 
cognitive scores, lower educational aspirations, and a greater likelihood of 
becoming teenage parents themselves. 
 (E) Being born out-of-wedlock significantly reduces the chances of the 
child growing up to have an intact marriage.  
 (F) Children born out-of-wedlock are 3 times more likely to be on welfare 
when they grow up. 
 . . . . 
 [9](C) Children born into families receiving welfare assistance are 3 times 
more likely to be on welfare when they reach adulthood than children not born 
into families receiving welfare. 
 . . . . 
 
185. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, § 102, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-12 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (2011)). 
186. AFDC, which Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256, 262 (1970), established as a 
statutory entitlement, was superseded by TANF, a fixed block grant program. Moreover, the 
legislation enacting TANF expressly provided that the program was not to be considered an 
individual entitlement. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (noting that TANF “shall not be interpreted to 
entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under this 
part”). 
187. Indeed, one would not be mistaken in arguing that all of the laws surrounding state 
assistance for indigent families represent the pregnancies of the poor as injuries to the body 
politic. See Khiara M. Bridges, Wily Patients, Welfare Queens, and the Reiteration of Race 
in the U.S., 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 33-43 (2007) (arguing that TANF implicitly 
condemns the fertility of poor women because the women will need to turn to the state for 
assistance in supporting their families). 
188. In his 1992 campaign, former President Clinton vowed to end “welfare as we 
know it.” See Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV. 471, 494 
(1997) (book review). The replacement of Aid for Families of Dependent Children with 
TANF is widely recognized as a fulfillment of that campaign promise. See, e.g., Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival 
of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1673 (2005).  
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 (J) Children of single-parent homes are 3 times more likely to fail and 
repeat a year in grade school than are children from intact 2-parent families. 
 (K) Children from single-parent homes are almost 4 times more likely to 
be expelled or suspended from school.  
 (L) Neighborhoods with larger percentages of youth aged 12 through 20 
and areas with higher percentages of single-parent households have higher 
rates of violent crime. 
 (M) Of those youth held for criminal offenses within the State juvenile 
justice system, only 29.8 percent lived primarily in a home with both parents. 
In contrast to these incarcerated youth, 73.9 percent of the 62,800,000 children 
in the Nation’s resident population were living with both parents.189 
Essentially, Congress traced the origin of various types of social malaise 
(including poor health, crime, child abuse and neglect, and poverty itself) to 
poor, unmarried women’s pregnancies.  
The PRWORA asserts that pregnancy is an injury. But, like Michael M., 
the PRWORA asserts that pregnancy is an injury not to the woman carrying the 
pregnancy. Rather, pregnancy, when carried by specific, poor, unmarried bod-
ies, is an injury to society. Again, the radical nature of the sexual assault stat-
utes that have been under discussion relates to the fact that it states, quite sub-
versively, that pregnancy may be experienced as a bodily injury to the woman, 
the would-be mother, who bears the pregnancy. 
Further, the PRWORA helps to make sense of the abortion funding cases. 
Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae together establish the principle that it vio-
lates neither poor women’s due process rights nor their equal protection guar-
antees for a state to prohibit the use of Medicaid funds for abortion190—even 
those that are medically necessary.191 While, in essentially compelling poor 
women to carry their unwanted pregnancies to term and to bear children that 
they do not want to have,192 Maher and Harris might be taken to assert that the 
pregnancies of these poor women are actually valuable; they are beautiful 
things that the women should recognize as such—positive things that the gov-
ernment may constitutionally refuse to have a part in destroying. However, at 
 
189. 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (Congressional Findings). 
190. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470, 474 (1977) (holding that a state prohibition on 
the use of Medicaid funds for abortion does not violate the Equal Protection Clause nor 
“impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe”). 
191. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) (concluding that the proscription of the 
use of federal Medicaid funds for even medically necessary abortions does not impinge “on 
the constitutionally protected freedom of choice recognized in [Roe v.] Wade”). 
192. There is a strong argument that the Court did not contemplate that the indigent 
women affected by its decision will actually be unable to obtain abortions. The Court 
asserted, “An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a 
consequence of [the proscription on the use of Medicaid funds for abortion]; she continues 
as before to be dependent on private sources for the services she desires.” Id. at 314 
(emphasis added) (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474). So, to the question of whether the Court 
thinks that, in the face of the proscription, poor women are going to access the abortion 
anyway, the answer must be in the affirmative. 
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the same time that the abortion funding cases assert this positive construction of 
pregnancy, PRWORA and the relatively begrudging approach that the govern-
ment has taken to assisting indigent families193 assert that these same pregnan-
cies, while positive to the women, are injuries to the nation. 
Something similar is at work in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the 
Family Medical Leave Act, the proper exploration of which begins with the 
Court’s decision in Geduldig v. Aiello.194 Geduldig upheld against an equal 
protection challenge the constitutionality of a California disability insurance 
program that excluded coverage of disabilities related to normal pregnancy.195 
The Court held that there were no gender classifications in the statute, reason-
ing that the state was not discriminating against women to the benefit of men. 
Instead, the state was discriminating against pregnant women to the benefit of 
“nonpregnant persons”—a category that includes both men and women.196 Be-
cause the majority found that the statute did not discriminate on the basis of 
sex, the Court used rational basis scrutiny in reviewing the plan.197 Under ra-
tional basis review, the Court reasoned that the state had a legitimate interest in 
maintaining the structure of the program in its current form, which managed to 
provide benefits to all who needed them (except for pregnant women, of 
 
193. Examples of the begrudging approach that TANF has taken are many. First, there 
is the requirement that women receiving funds from the program must “work” at least thirty 
hours per week; however, TANF refuses to define the labor involved in raising a child as 
“work.” See 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(i), (d). Secondly, TANF prohibits families 
from receiving funds for more than five years (subject to limited exceptions), even if the 
family has not managed to lift itself out of poverty during that time. See id. § 608(a)(7). 
Finally, TANF implicitly authorizes states to implement “family caps,” which “cap” the 
amount of money a family may receive, even though the size of the family may increase 
upon the birth of an additional child. See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: 
Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 153-54 
(2006) (“The final version of TANF, signed into law by President Clinton in August 1996, 
did not require states to implement caps, but instead, by remaining silent, allowed states to 
continue utilizing existing family cap policies [that they were using under AFDC] or enact 
new caps without federal oversight.”). 
194. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
195. Accordingly, should a pregnant woman be hospitalized and unable to return to her 
job subsequent to a normal delivery during which there were no medical complications, she 
would not be eligible to receive disability benefits from the plan to which she was obliged to 
contribute. See id. at 491 (explaining that, as construed by a California court, the plan 
excluded “‘maternity benefits’—i.e., hospitalization and disability benefits for normal 
delivery and recuperation”); see also id. at 487 (describing participation in the disability 
program as “mandatory” absent comparable coverage under a private plan).  
196. Id. at 497 n.20 (“The program divides potential recipients into two groups—
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the 
second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus 
accrue to members of both sexes.”). 
197. Id. at 495 (indicating that the Court would use the same level of review that it uses 
for “social welfare programs” and thus requiring that the basis for the classification that the 
law uses be “rationally supportable”). 
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course) without requiring funding from outside sources.198 The Court held that 
the Constitution did not prohibit the state from deciding to exclude coverage of 
disabilities as costly as those precipitated by pregnancy in order to maintain the 
self-sufficiency of the program.199 
So, what kind of idea of pregnancy informs the Geduldig decision? What 
are the discursive effects of embodying this idea in law? While Geduldig is 
rightfully criticized by those who are concerned with the practical effects of the 
decision (i.e., it makes it harder for women, respective to their male counter-
parts, to be both labor force participants and parents), it may be rightfully 
commended by those who are interested in the discursive effects of the case. 
Quite simply, Geduldig stands for the proposition that a healthy pregnancy is 
not a disability.200 As one commentator describes it, “Pregnancy is not a rare 
occurrence, and in one sense could be considered ‘normal’ . . . .”201 This is a 
position that, in other contexts, feminists have championed in order to chal-
lenge the idea, steeped in paternalism, that pregnant women need to be treated 
as if infirm or in need of protection.202 As one scholar notes on this point, 
Although many feminists wish to secure tangible benefits for pregnant 
workers, they fear the characterization of pregnancy as a disability. Some are 
reticent to admit that some women, particularly pregnant women, may not be 
able to conform to the demands of the traditional workplace nor to fit the mold 
of the idealized worker.203 
 
198. Id. at 496 (noting that California has a “legitimate interest in maintaining the self-
supporting nature” of the disability program and, consequently, has considerable latitude in 
determining how much employees could be required to contribute and matching that level of 
contribution to a menu of disabilities that would be covered by the plan). 
199. Id. at 495-96 (observing that a program that covered the costs of pregnancy-related 
disabilities “would be substantially more costly than the present program and would 
inevitably require state subsidy, a higher rate of employee contribution, a lower scale of 
benefits for those suffering from insured disabilities, or some combination of these 
measures”). 
200. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The 
Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1563 (1974) (“The notion that pregnancy is 
different from other disabilities with respect to a state disability insurance program suggests 
the familiar set of stereotypes— . . . that pregnancy, though it keeps women from working, is 
not a ‘disability’ but a blessing which fulfills every woman’s deepest wish . . . .”); cf. Diane 
L. Zimmerman, Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition 
of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 444 (1975) (“[The state] insisted that 
pregnancy and birth were not disabilities at all but ‘a normal physiological function’—
despite the fact that most births in the United States occur in hospitals, require minor surgery 
(an episiotomy), can lead to death, and, at the very least, leave most women physically 
unable to work for a period of several weeks.” (footnote omitted)). 
201. Bartlett, supra note 200, at 1561. 
202. See Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: 
Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193, 
195 (1993) (“Feminists’ refusal to describe pregnancy as ‘disability’ is understandable in 
light of the negative connotations of permanence and misfortune.”). 
203. Id. at 194.  
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Geduldig holds, and sediments as law, that a pregnancy without medical 
complications is a state of health, not a state of disease. Pregnant women are 
not damaged members of the body politic requiring special consideration. In-
stead, like their nonpregnant male and female counterparts, they are full, capa-
bly self-sufficient participants. The reality, of course, is that the two paradigms 
of pregnancy are not mutually exclusive. That is, pregnancy may be both a state 
of health and a condition that, at some points—and definitely at the very end of 
it, when the pregnant woman transforms back into a “nonpregnant person”—
requires a different set of considerations. 
It is not unreasonable to assert that the Court’s decision in Geduldig was, at 
least partially, a product of the inability of the Justices who signed onto the ma-
jority opinion to accept an idea of pregnancy as a disability.204 “Disability” has 
connotations of sickness, a state of ill health, and, importantly, having been 
harmed or injured in some way.205 To understand a healthy pregnancy without 
any medical complications as a disability is to challenge positive constructions 
of pregnancy as a necessarily “good” thing that happens to women; it is to un-
derstand a pregnancy as being an injury. This is not to say that positive con-
structions of pregnancy were singularly responsible for the Geduldig majority 
opinion and its refusal to align pregnancy with disability. However, it is to say 
that the Justices who signed on to the majority opinion could be assured that 
their decision was the “right” one because, among other things, it was discur-
sively consistent with cultural constructions of pregnancy as distinct from an 
injury.  
Similarly, one cannot argue that positive constructions of pregnancy as in-
trinsically good were singularly responsible for the Court’s decision in General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,206 which upheld against a Title VII207 challenge a pri-
vate employer’s disability insurance program that excluded coverage of disabil-
ities related to normal pregnancy. However, such positive constructions might 
have informed the Court’s approving reference to the lower court’s finding that 
pregnancy is “significantly different from the typical covered disease or disabil-
 
204. Indeed, this was the precise argument that the plaintiffs made during the litigation. 
See Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination 
Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“According to the 
plaintiffs [in Geduldig], normal pregnancy was ‘functionally indistinguishable’ from other 
disabilities because it required medical care, hospitalization, anesthesia, surgical procedures, 
and genuine risk to life.”). 
205. See Matzzie, supra note 202, at 194 (“[P]regnancy is presumed to be natural and 
good, whereas disabilities are presumed to be unnatural and bad. Pregnancy is described as a 
matter of individual choice, whereas disabilities are described as immutable and unfortunate, 
an accident of birth or circumstance that one would never choose.”). 
206. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
207. “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2011). 
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ity. . . . [I]t is not a ‘disease’ at all, and is often a voluntarily undertaken and de-
sired condition.”208 The Geduldig and Gilbert Courts might have held that 
pregnancy was an injury, but it was an injury sufficiently distinct from the inju-
ries covered by the employer. Accordingly, it was an injury, the costs of which 
were rightfully and fairly borne by the “injured” woman. But the Court did not 
choose this line of argumentation, instead denying that pregnancy was an injury 
in all respects.209 
Congress responded to the Court’s decision in Gilbert by passing the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which amended Title VII to make clear that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex-based discrimination in viola-
tion of the statute210 absent a showing of a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion.211 The immediate effect of the PDA was to signal that the ruling in Gil-
bert was erroneous, thus leading to the Court’s holding in Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC that private employers were required to 
extend the same disability benefits to pregnant employees as they do to other 
employees who are incapable of working due to a disability of some kind.212 
 
208. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136; see also Finley, supra note 52, at 1136 (noting that “[b]y 
emphasizing the normalcy of pregnancy,” the Court in Gilbert was able to contrast coverage 
for pregnancy and related conditions “to the very idea of a disability plan”). 
209. Using reasoning similar to that of Geduldig and Gilbert, most courts have 
interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to exclude pregnancy within the term 
“disability.” See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, 
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1357, 1371 n.38 (2009) (citing a case collecting authorities for the proposition that 
“[p]regnancy generally is not considered a ‘disability’ for ADA purposes”); see also EEOC 
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2012) (interpretive guidance to 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(h)) (“Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological 
disorder are not impairments.”). However, regulations promulgated under the ADA include 
as “disabilities” those that result from or are exacerbated by pregnancy. Id. § 1604.10(b) 
(“Disabilities caused by or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the same as disabilities caused or 
contributed to by other medical conditions . . . .”). Some have argued that pregnancy, in and 
of itself, should be understood as a “disability” within the ADA. See, e.g., Matzzie, supra 
note 202, at 218-24. 
210. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (providing that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions” and requiring that pregnant women “be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability 
or inability to work”). 
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice . . . [to 
discriminate] on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”). 
212. See 462 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1983) (striking down the disability plan at issue because 
“the husbands of female employees receive a specified level of hospitalization coverage for 
all conditions [while] the wives of male employees receive such coverage except for 
pregnancy-related conditions”). 
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The protections provided by the amendment, however, were broader. Generally 
speaking, the PDA gives pregnant employees “the right not to be treated ad-
versely because of pregnancy; and . . . the right to be treated the same as other 
employees . . . similar in their ability or inability to work with respect to all as-
pects of employment, including benefits such as leave and insurance.”213  
As such, the question becomes: does the PDA, like the criminal statutes 
that provide that causing pregnancy is an aggravating factor in grading sexual 
assaults, challenge the positive construction of pregnancy by compelling em-
ployers, and courts reviewing employers’ decisions, to treat pregnancy as a 
bodily injury? The answer, as it turns out, is complicated. On the one hand, the 
purpose of the statute is to prohibit employers from treating pregnant women as 
injured employees. As Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas note, in granting 
pregnant employees the right not to be treated adversely because of pregnancy, 
the PDA prevents employers from making “stereotyped assumptions about a 
pregnant woman’s inability to carry out certain tasks.”214 Thus, an employer 
cannot merely assume that because a woman is pregnant, she suffers from an 
incapacity that makes her unable to do the job that she was hired to do.215 
On the other hand, the statute forces the equation of pregnancy with injury 
and disability216: first, in overruling the logic of Gilbert, it requires employers 
to treat pregnancy as a disability with respect to the provision of disability ben-
efits.217 Second, in the analysis of whether a pregnant employee has been treat-
 
213. Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 
24 (2009) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
214. Id. at 18. 
215. The Due Process Clause has been interpreted to provide an equivalent right against 
such assumptions. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974) (striking 
down a school board’s policy of prohibiting women from working once they had reached a 
specific stage in their pregnancies). 
216. Christine Littleton observes that the PDA denies the uniqueness of pregnancy by 
simply analogizing it to an injury, which is an experience that employers and men can 
understand: “[P]regnancy renders a woman unable to work for a few days to a few months, 
just like illness and injury do for men.” Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual 
Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1306 (1987). However, she goes on to note that the 
analogy is inappropriate. Pregnant women and women recovering from pregnancy are only 
“injured” to the extent that they cannot labor at their jobs. However, they are not “injured” 
such that they cannot labor at all; indeed, during the period of time in which they cannot 
work at their place of employment, they are working at the production of another human 
being. As Littleton explains, “Normal pregnancy may make a woman unable to ‘work’ for 
days, weeks or months, but it also makes her able to reproduce. From whose viewpoint is the 
work that she cannot do ‘work,’ and the work that she is doing not work? Certainly not from 
hers.” Id. 
217. One of the criticisms of the PDA is that, while the statute requires that employers 
treat pregnant employees as well as other disabled employees, it also allows employers to 
treat pregnant employees as badly as other disabled employees. Thus, if an employer does 
not provide disability benefits generally, it does not violate Title VII by refusing to provide 
disability benefits to pregnant employees. See Williams, supra note 52, at 375 (“If pregnant 
workers and others are treated equally badly by the employer, and if the employer’s rule 
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ed the same as other employees “similar in their ability or inability to work,” it 
requires courts to compare a pregnant woman with a person suffering from a 
disability or injury that has made him or her unable to work.218 Thus, it is fair 
to argue that, under the PDA, pregnancy is analogized to an injury. However, 
this representation of pregnancy is not quite as subversive as that effected by 
the sexual assault statutes under discussion. First, pregnancy within the PDA is 
only analogized to an injury, not defined as one; accordingly, pregnancy re-
mains consistent with positive constructions. Second, and more importantly, 
unlike the PDA, the sexual assault statutes under discussion reflect a woman’s 
experience of a pregnancy. They indicate a phenomenology of pregnancy in 
which the woman feels like something has gone terribly wrong in her body. The 
criminal law embodies, and legitimizes, an experience (shared by countless 
women) in which pregnancy is a wound of some sort from which the woman 
struggles to recover. This is an understanding of pregnancy that is inconsistent 
with positive constructions of the event. 
The PDA, however, is consistent with positive constructions of pregnancy. 
This is primarily because positive constructions of pregnancy embrace the bur-
densome aspects of the phenomenon. Indeed, the pains and deprivations inher-
ent in pregnancy are, in part, those which ennoble women who become mothers 
and which make them deserving of society’s esteem. The PDA does a lot inas-
much as it requires that the employer bear some of the costs of these pains and 
deprivations, and the consequences thereof. But it does no more than that. As 
such, the PDA does not attempt to embody or reflect a phenomenology of 
pregnancy. While the statute is progressive insofar as it rejects a traditional 
framework in which being a mother and being a labor force participant are mu-
tually exclusive, it is not subversive of discourses that assert that pregnancy is, 
ultimately and always, a positive event for the woman. 
What is noteworthy about the PDA is that it compels that all pregnancies, 
including wanted ones, be constructed as disabilities. Accordingly, even wanted 
pregnancies, which may be experienced positively by the woman, are cogniza-
ble as disabilities under the statute.219 It would appear, then, that this function 
 
does not disproportionately harm women, then a non-discrimination law like Title VII is not 
violated.”). However, Title VII is not violated if an employer provides disability benefits to 
pregnant employees while denying disability benefits generally. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) (“Congress intended the PDA to be a floor 
beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they 
may not rise.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
218. See Jessica Carvey Manners, Note, The Search for Mr. Troupe: The Need to 
Eliminate Comparison Groups in Pregnancy Discrimination Act Cases, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 
209, 213-14 (2005) (noting that when plaintiffs allege pregnancy discrimination, courts have 
to determine whether others who were similarly situated received different treatment, thus 
requiring courts to compare pregnant employees with employees who are disabled or 
injured).  
219. Julie Novkov notes the irony that the PDA forces intensely wanted pregnancies to 
be constructed as disabilities when she writes that “[t]he law equates it with disease or injury 
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of the PDA shares a logic with the Court’s decision in Michael M.220 (and with 
the Congress whose legislative findings preceded the PRWORA221). That is, 
that which makes a pregnancy an injury (or a disability, or a cost, or a phenom-
enon that is “inflicted”) is not a woman’s experience of it. Instead, pregnancies 
are injuries because of the effect that they have on the community in which the 
woman is embedded.222 In Michael M., the relevant community injured by the 
pregnancy was society, which was compelled either to subsidize the costs of 
the child that the pregnancy produced or to live with the fact of fetuses de-
stroyed via abortion. With respect to the PDA, the relevant community injured 
by the pregnancy depends on the structure of the disability benefits. The injured 
party could be the community of employees, who must contribute at higher 
rates to their insurance plan because of its coverage of pregnancy-related disa-
bilities. Alternatively, the injured party could be the employer, who must bear 
some of the costs associated with the pregnancy if paid disability leave is pro-
vided as a benefit.223 
The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) does similar work to that per-
formed by the PDA. The FMLA entitles a covered employee to twelve weeks 
of unpaid leave upon the occurrence of one of several itemized events.224 The 
events include the birth of a child and the advent of a “serious health condition 
 
and does not respect its status as a chosen and desired state of being.” Julie Novkov, Note, A 
Deconstruction of (M)otherhood and a Reconstruction of Parenthood, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 155, 181 (1991-1992) (footnote omitted); see also Finley, supra note 52, at 
1136 (noting the belief that pregnancy should not be covered within employer disability 
plans because it “is normal and natural for women, and is a voluntary choice that they 
make. . . . [I]t would be a shame to treat something so natural, that women freely choose, as 
if it were something unfortunate like a workplace injury”); Manners, supra note 218, at 224 
(“Should an employer place the same value on pregnancy as it does on an injury . . . ? 
Presumably, accidents and injuries should be discouraged to the extent that they are a result 
of carelessness and bad judgment. Should the same value also apply to pregnancy?”). Of 
course, the thrust of this Article is to argue that there is no irony in constructing intensely 
unwanted pregnancies as injuries (or diseases or disabilities).  
220. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). For a detailed discussion 
of Michael M., see supra notes 170-182 and accompanying text.  
221. See supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text. 
222. Again, Novkov insightfully notes the irony of society valuing (the idea of) 
pregnancy, but being injured by actual, material pregnancies: “[T]he idea that childbearing is 
valuable to society, a concept so pervasive in the construction of women as mothers with 
respect to our role in the family, is utterly invisible in civil society. After all, how can a 
‘disability’ possibly be construed as a benefit to society?” Novkov, supra note 219, at 181. 
223. Manners observes the cost-sharing function of covering pregnancy within 
disability insurance programs and providing paid disability leaves. Manners, supra note 218, 
at 229-30 (observing that European countries that provide robust legal protection of pregnant 
employees “accept[] the necessary costs of pregnant workers and distribute[] the cost among 
society,” as compared to the “the current American standard [which] tends to place the social 
cost of pregnancy on those female workers who bear children” (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
224. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 102, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, 9-
10 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2011)). 
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that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such 
employee.”225 Thus, the FMLA couples family leave and medical leave and, in 
the process, analogizes pregnancy and childbirth to a “serious health condi-
tion.”226 It is not unreasonable to conclude that, as a result of this analogy, 
pregnancy is likened to a disability, sickness, illness, or injury.227 But, like the 
PDA, the injury is not to the woman, who may be experiencing her pregnancy, 
if wanted, as positive; like the PDA, pregnancy is an injury under the FMLA 
not because of the law’s recognition of the woman’s phenomenology of the 
bodily event. Instead, pregnancy is an injury because it is only when it is under-
stood as such that one can justify shifting its costs to third parties, like an em-
ployer or society more generally.228  
But, is it fair to say that the FMLA constructs pregnancy as an injury to the 
body politic (as do Michael M. and the legislative findings that precede the 
PRWORA)? Alternatively, is it fair to say that the FMLA constructs pregnancy 
as an injury to the smaller community within which the pregnant woman is em-
bedded (as does the PDA)? Both formulations of the question must be an-
swered in the negative—primarily because the leave guaranteed under the 
FMLA is unpaid. The reason why it is fair to describe society, the employer, or 
the community of employees as injured by a woman’s pregnancy in Michael 
M., the PRWORA, and the PDA is because the costs of the pregnancy were ex-
ternalized onto these parties. Except for the costs associated with holding open 
the pregnant employee’s position for the period of time during which she takes 
her leave and with reintegrating her into the workplace when she returns, ac-
commodating a woman’s pregnancy does not impose any costs on an employer 
(or on other employees or society) under the FMLA.229 Because the leave is 
 
225. 29 U.S.C. § 2612. 
226. Julie Suk has done convincing work to argue that part of the success that France 
and Sweden have achieved in reconciling parenting with labor market participation is due to 
those countries having decoupled family leave from medical leave. See Suk, supra note 204, 
at 24 (arguing that disaggregating family leave and medical leave “would enable family 
leave to be debated on its own merits, without the cloud of potential abuse and heightened 
costs associated with medical leave”). 
227. See id. at 7 (noting that the FMLA “does not distinguish the medical incapacity to 
work as a result of pregnancy and childbirth from other medical conditions that might 
require an employee to miss work”). 
228. Suk acknowledges the historical contingency of the construction of pregnancy as a 
disability, noting that it was beneficial to litigants in the 1970s to construct pregnancy in this 
manner in order to bootstrap maternity benefits onto an already-existing structure of 
disability benefits. Id. at 41 (making this observation in the context of Title VII litigation). 
The FMLA is an extension of the logic that began in the Title VII setting. Id. at 47 (“[T]he 
PDA and the antidiscrimination framing of the FMLA tend to reinforce the analogy between 
pregnancy and sickness that was forged in the 1970s.”).  
229. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 104, 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (providing that 
an employer must restore an employee who has taken leave “to the position of employment 
held by the employee when the leave commenced; or . . . to an equivalent position with 
equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment”).  
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unpaid, the woman is compelled to bear the costs of the pregnancy herself.230 
Thus, pregnancy is only mimetic of an injury under the FMLA. Although it in-
jures neither the woman nor third parties, it must assume the form of an injury 
in order to be recognized by law. 
The analysis would be different if employees were guaranteed a paid ma-
ternity leave by statute. If the leave is paid because it is a benefit conferred by 
the employer, the employer bears (some of) the costs of the pregnancy and, as 
such, might be conceptualized as being injured by the pregnancy.231 Of course, 
it may be inappropriate to conceptualize pregnancy as an injury in such a case, 
which stands in contrast to a situation in which the employer is compelled, by 
law, to provide a paid maternity leave. In the former situation, the employer has 
voluntarily conferred the benefit to an employee. Accordingly, there is a 
wantedness associated with the conferral of the benefit. Like the woman who 
bears a wanted pregnancy, the employer may not be injured by the pregnancy 
as a consequence.  
In summary, Michael M., the PRWORA, and the PDA construct pregnancy 
as an injury to the body politic. As such, they are to be contrasted to the dis-
cussed sexual assault statutes that, reflecting women’s phenomenologies of 
unwanted pregnancy, construct pregnancy as an injury to the woman bearing it. 
Because Michael M., the PRWORA, and the PDA are uninterested in, or un-
successful in, reflecting a profoundly subversive experience of pregnancy, they 
do not have the same potential as do the sexual assault statutes, which give this 
nonhegemonic construction of pregnancy the force of law, to destabilize posi-
tive constructions of pregnancy and to change the culture that inevitably re-
flects the law. 
 
230. See Suk, supra note 204, at 8-9 (citing a Labor Department study showing that 
300,000 parents eligible for unpaid leave under the FMLA were unable to take advantage of 
the benefit and coming to “the commonsense conclusion that very few families are both able 
and willing to live for the first six months of a newborn’s life without a salary”). 
231. In the European countries that Suk analyzes in her critique of the approach taken to 
family leave in the United States, workers are guaranteed a paid parental leave; however, it 
is the government that bears the costs of providing the paid leave. Id. at 27, 36 (noting that in 
France and Sweden, it is not the employer who is obligated to pay for maternity leave, but 
rather the government). Accordingly, one may be tempted to argue that society-qua-
taxpayers are injured by the woman’s pregnancy. However, the thrust of Suk’s analysis is to 
demonstrate the advantages that these countries have achieved by decoupling family leave 
from medical leave. Because of this decoupling, family leave is not constructed as a species 
of medical leave; thus, pregnancy is not constructed as a species of injury. Id. at 47 (arguing 
that “[c]ountries that successfully reconcile work-family conflict” do not construct 
pregnancy as an injury); cf. Manners, supra note 218, at 227 (citing a pregnancy 
discrimination case heard by the European Court of Justice in which the court held that 
“pregnancy is not in any way comparable with a pathological condition” (emphasis 
omitted)). As a result, it may be inapposite to understand those societies as being injured by 
a woman’s pregnancy, as pregnancy is not constructed as an injury—at all—by these 
statutory schemes.  
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CONCLUSION  
This Article has offered that statutes that provide that causing pregnancy is 
an aggravating factor when grading a sexual assault introduce the pregnancy-
as-injury definition into law, society, and culture. Further, this introduction is a 
radical one because it challenges positive, hegemonic understandings of preg-
nancy and, consequently, is a subversive reimagining of pregnancy that has the 
sanction of law.  
The pregnancy-as-injury definition offered by the sexual assault statutes 
under analysis is powerful because it imputes a far-from-positive meaning to 
pregnancy, and it embalms this understanding of pregnancy in law. As law in-
fluences culture, subversive understandings of pregnancy may become more 
legitimate. The culture may then influence law, which then may reflect the dis-
ruption to hegemony. And the dialectic turns.  
It is true that the sexual assault statutes under analysis have been law for 
many years now. A relevant question, then, is why they have not managed to 
influence culture in the way that this Article suggests they might. It is difficult 
to provide a complete answer. But at least part of the answer must be that those 
who are sensitive to the reality of the subversive understanding of pregnancy—
that is, abortion rights advocates who know that women frequently experience 
unwanted pregnancies as physical injuries that are hurting their bodies and de-
stroying their lives—have failed to leverage the fact that the analyzed sexual 
assault statutes represent that truth. It might be overly optimistic, and ultimately 
unrealistic, to expect that, simply because these laws are on the books, they will 
influence culture. Instead, there might need to be an intentionality behind the 
dialectical relationship between law and culture. That is to say, abortion rights 
advocates might need to leverage—consciously and purposefully—the under-
standing of pregnancy contained in some jurisdictions’ criminal law. Advocates 
need to disseminate it into culture via the same avenues that currently reflect 
positive constructions of pregnancy: music, movies, television shows, popular 
discourse in the form of blogs and social media, and political discourse. 
If they are successful, they will make possible the day when it will be logi-
cal to claim not only that an unwanted pregnancy is like being stabbed in the 
heart, but that being stabbed in the heart is like an unwanted pregnancy. 
